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This study examines the motivations of the terrorist organization al Qaeda in 
facilitating the September 11 terrorist attacks involving the hijacking of four commercial 
jets and the subsequent crashing of two of these aircraft into the World Trade Center in 
New York, one into the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and a fourth into an abandoned 
field. 
This study was based on the premise that extending Hobbes’s concept of the 
egoistic state of nature to the conditions prevalent in international relations lends itself to 
an explanatory analysis of what motivated al Qaeda to facilitate the September 11 
terrorist attacks. 
A descriptive analysis of the applicable aspects of Hobbes’s political philosophy 
was performed for the purpose of establishing a conceptual relationship between 
Hobbes’s notion of the egoistic state of nature and the violent conditions that exist in 
global affairs that lead to political violence like the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
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The conclusions drawn from the findings suggest that there is a conceptual 
relationship between Hobbes’s concept of the egoistic state of nature extended to 
international relations and the motivations that led al Qaeda to facilitate the September 11 
attacks. Secondly, if steps are not taken to lessen the Hobbesian state of nature conditions 
prevalent in international affairs, then terrorist acts like the September 11 attacks will 
continue in the future. 
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The post-World War II period as yielded numerous theoretical studies regarding 
the nature, characterization, and causes of violent conflict in international relations.1 
International relations’ phenomena referred to as transnational terrorism (political 
violence carried out by non-state actors) has prominently emerged as a major area of 
study in academic circles. Transnational terrorism, though considerably different from 
global political violence facilitated by states, still represents political violence being 
facilitated in the global political arena.3 Based on this premise, the September 11 terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and on the Pentagon represent political acts 
designed to accomplish political goals and objectives. Conceptualizing such acts of 
violence as inherently political allow for a systematic framework to analyze the causes of 
these attacks. According to translations of transcripts of a video tape Osama bin Laden 
1 Gleen Palmer, “Game Theory: Cooperation and Conflict” in Peace: Meanings, 
Politics, Strategies, ed. Linda Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1989), 179. 
2 
Kent Layne Oots, A Political Organization Approach to Transnational 
Terrorism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 3-12. 
3 Bard O’Neill, “Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis,” in Insurgency in the 
Modern World, ed. Bard O’Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts (Boulder, 
CO, 1980), 4. 
1 
2 
(the self-proclaimed leader of al Qaeda) admits that operatives associated with and/or 
financed by al Qaeda were the transnational organization that facilitated the September 
11 attacks that left over 3,000 people dead.4 Additionally, bin Laden has called for a 
jihad or holy war) against the United States, and the September 11 attacks represent the 
most devastating element (to date) of this holy war.5 
Statement of Research Question 
The central research problem that this study examinesis reflected in the central 
research question: What is one theoretical framework that can be used to explain why al 
Qaeda would facilitate political violence in the form of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks? Accordingly, this study hypothesizes the following: By employing the 
inferences drawn from Hobbes’s principals of the egoistic state of nature6 and the 
anarchical conditions prevalent in global relations (the international state of nature), and 
4 “Transcript of Usama bin Laden Video Tape,” trans. George Michael and 
Kassem M. Wahba [resource on-line] (Washington D.C.: Federation of American 
Scientists, 13 December 2001, accessed 23 February 2003); available from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-video.html; Internet. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or, The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common 
Wealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil, ed. Alfred Rayney Waller (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1904), 81-84. This reprint of Leviathan (as well as other 
scholarly sources that are used in this study) represent digitized versions of the original, 
verbatim content of these sources and are used for the purpose of ensuring the most 
accurate interpretation of these sources. Specifically, the reprint of Leviathan that is used 
in this study represents the 1651 original printing (see editors “Note,” v-vi in this print of 
Leviathan) of Hobbes’s work and contains some typographical, punctuation, and spelling 
errors that have been retained in the direct quotes (from Hobbes’s writings) used in this 
study. 
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then extending these inferences to the egoistic motivations of al Qaeda (a political 
organization acting out in the anarchical conditions prevalent in global affairs), a strong 
relationship between these variables and the causes of the September 11 terrorist attacks 
may be formulated. Subsequently, the independent variable is Hobbes’s conception of 
egoism extended to the international state of nature. The dependent variable is 
represented by the September 11 terrorist attacks. The main goal of this study is to 
determine the relationship between these variables. 
Theoretical Framework 
This study is specifically concerned with Hobbes's conception of the egoistic state 
of nature applied to the anarchical conditions prevalent in global affairs as a theoretical 
approach for explaining the causes of the September 11 attacks. Correspondingly, 
Hobbes's egoistic theory of human nature, in terms of the pursuit of self-interest, self- 
preservation, and power and glorification, provides an explanation for the existence of an 
anarchical state of nature.7 Hobbes posits that human nature is egoistic (consisting of 
self-interested behavior) and, as a result, individuals by nature are competitive, power 
hungry beings set on the pursuit of self-conservation and pleasure.8 This “natural 
condition” leads to a state of nature in which everyone unabashedly pursues these natural 
tendencies by any means he or she deems necessary.9 Hobbes’s theory of the state of 
7 Ibid, 83. 
o 
Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis, 
trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), 122-124. 
9 Ibid. 
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nature is based on the assumption that individuals possess a natural desire to express 
egoistic tendencies in the absence of sovereign political authority.10 For Hobbes, the 
morality and constraint of individuals who possess these desires come only as a result of 
forming a social contract.11 Extending Hobbes’s conceptualization of the state of nature 
to international relations yields the following supposition: If there is not a fully 
encompassing, binding contract among political actors acting out in the global political 
arena, then there are no constraining principles that inhibit the behavior of these actors. 
The above-stated ideas provide the rationale for the adoption and application of 
the Hobbesian theoretical framework to this study. The September 11 attacks represent 
global terrorism, and, within the context of global relations, a type of Hobbesian state of 
nature (the international state of nature) exists in the absence of a binding social contract 
between political actors in the global political arena and an international sovereign 
capable of managing the anarchical conditions prevalent in international affairs. 
Consequently, political actors engage in struggles similar to the struggles that would exist 
in the Hobbesian state of nature. Under the conditions of the Hobbesian state of nature 
every political actor has the "right" to express its natural egoistic behaviors in any manner 
it deems necessary. Moreover, the fact that Hobbes believes that human nature is egoistic 
10 T. E. Jessop, Thomas Hobbes (London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1960), 
18. 
11 Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1989), 68- 
70. 
12 G. M. Tarnas, “Beyond the Nation State,” Social Research 63, no. 1 (1996): 
191. 
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also partly explains why political actors (both human, state-based, and transnational- 
oriented) would resort to the type of political violence defined as terrorism. This study 
will show that all human political actors exhibit the same natural egoistic tendencies, and 
these tendencies express themselves in the political actions of these actors. As a result, 
groups, like al Qaeda, may consider themselves to be relatively free from any moral 
constraints as they carry out violent political acts. The only constraints on political actors 
are the limitations of access to material resources and manpower. 
Non-state, transnational terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, exist and operate in a 
relativity subordinate power position within the international political order and compete 
with the overwhelming force and power of nation-states such as the United States, its 
allies, and its client states. United States’ client states are defined for the purposes of this 
study as states directly influenced or to a significant degree controlled by the United 
States. Some examples of allies and client states of the United States that are relevant to 
the concerns of this study are the sovereigns of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Pakistan, 
and Israel. Based on the fact that al Qaeda is a subordinate political actor (in the sense 
that it has relatively less capabilities than the United States), the organization resorts to 
political extremism in the form of terrorism to compete against the dominant power of the 
United States.13 Within the spectrum of its desire to compete for political power, al 
Qaeda responds to the dominant power and influence of the United States by expressing 
its own relative power capabilities14 through terrorist attacks. It is conceivable, therefore, 
13 Richard K. Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical 
Advantages of Terror," Political Science Quarterly 117 (2002):19-21. 
14 Claes G. Ryn, “Dimensions of Power: The Transformation of Liberalism and 
the Limits of‘Politics’,” Humanitas 13, no. 2 (2000): 4. 
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that al Qaeda views the current international political system as one consisting of a 
hegemonic hierarchy controlled by the U.S. that ultimately makes many Muslims’ lives 
worse and less secure. 
Critical Assumptions Based on Hobbes’s Theoretical Formulations 
A crucial question, when applying Hobbes’s perspective to the goals of al Qaeda, 
then, is whether an intensification of the state of nature in the global political arena 
(wherein political actors can do whatever their capacity for the exercise of power allows, 
including the use of political violence) is preferable to the current global realities that 
include the U.S. as the premier hegemonic power in world affairs? Consequently, in 
providing an answer to this inquiry, consideration must be given to the following set of 
assumptions derived from Hobbes’s theory: 
(1) The expression of Hobbesian egoistic tendencies by human political actors in 
international affairs leads to an international state of nature; 
(2) In the absence of sovereign political authority, Hobbes’s conception of a 
state of nature, when extended to international relations and exacerbated by 
the expression of the stated egoistic tendencies, leads to anarchical 
conditions in the global political arena; 
(3) In an international state of nature, political actors may pursue their egoistic 
tendencies without constraint and in any manner they deem necessary; 
(4) The members of Al Qaeda, as human political actors, facilitate terrorist 
actions within the anarchical conditions of the Hobbesian international state 
of nature. 
Al Qaeda’s Goals and Strategies 
Given the above assumption or formulations, it is unnecessary to show that al 
Qaeda’s leaders believe that their goals are Hobbesian in nature, only that their goals 
reflect some aspects of Hobbes’s egoistic state of nature. This minimal necessity lends 
7 
itself to a brief description of the stated goals and objectives of A1 Qaeda. According to 
John Pike: 
Al-Qa’ida is multi-national, with members from numerous countries and 
with a worldwide presence. Senior leaders in the organization are also 
senior leaders in other terrorist organizations, including those designated 
by the Department of State as foreign terrorist organizations, such as the 
Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian al-Jihad. A1 Qaeda 
seeks a global radicalization of existing Islamic groups and the creation of 
radical Islamic groups where none exist [s/c]. 
A1 Qa’ida supports Muslim fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, 
Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Kosovo. It also trains members of 
terrorist organizations from such diverse countries as the Philippines, 
Algeria, and Eritrea. 
Al-Qa’ida da’s goal is to ‘unite all Muslims and to establish a government 
which follows the rule of the Caliphs.’ Bin Laden has stated that the only 
way to establish the Caliphate is by force. A1 Qaeda’s goal, therefore, is to 
overthrow nearly all Muslim governments, which are viewed as corrupt, to 
drive Western influence from those countries, and eventually to abolish 
state boundaries .... 
[The organization] issued statements [sic] under banner of ‘the World 
Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders’ in February 1998, 
saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens-[.v/c] civilian or 
military—and their allies everywhere ....15 
Pikes’ descriptions of al Qaeda are particularly informative because they are 
derived from direct quotes from the al Qaeda leadership. 
Dependence on “In Trust” Relations 
One element that contributes to the achievement of the above-stated goals of al 
Qaeda is the ability of the organization to garner financial resources. According to 
investigative reporter Adam Cohen, al Qaeda solicits donations from like-minded 
supporters and siphons funds from Muslim charitable organizations to finance its 
15 John Pike, “al-Qa'ida (The Base),” [on-line database] (Washington, D.C.: 
Federation of American Scientists, accessed 30 April 2003); available from 
http://www.fas.org/irp.worId/ para/ladin.htm; Internet. 
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activities.16 As the organization evolved from a national organization in Afghanistan to a 
multi-national network operating globally, it used the concept of Hawala to secretly 
facilitate its goals.17 Hawala loosely translates in Arabic to “in trust,” but generally refers 
to a bond of trust between transacting individuals, and has historically been used to refer 
to a special informal way of carrying out business transactions and relaying information 
in Central Asian cultures. This informal mechanism (in some, but not all instances), is 
noted for not leaving a “paper trail” and illustrates an unique Arab approach to 
business.19 It is believed that Hawala is used by al Qaeda to secretly transfer money and 
to make global financial transactions.20 
Violence as a Play to the Media 
Hawala and similar methods reflect social norms and practices that have existed 
within Arab and Muslim cultures for centuries. Unfortunately, some Americans are not 
aware of the diversity and complexity of Arab and Muslim culture and may tend to 
stereotype all Arab Muslims as anti-American terrorists. Much of what American citizens 
learn about the world is package by mainstream media television outlets through visual 






imagery that oversimplifies and misrepresents reality.21 It could reasonably be argued 
that after September 11 some elements within the American mainstream television media 
framed their coverage within a perspective that views U.S. policy as always representing 
that which is “good” and “moral,” and Islamic culture as representing that which is “bad” 
and “evil.” The American mainstream television media have tremendous sway in 
shaping American public opinion.22 Consequently, as suggested by Doris Graber, the 
limited worldview of Americans evolves from the oversimplified images presented by the 
media.23 
The role played by the media is critical to the dramatization of terrorist attacks, 
because the media unwittingly serves the interests of the terrorists by emphasizing the 
violent nature of the attacks through its continual coverage. Therefore, terrorists tend to 
attempt to carry out attacks that will provide the media with the most dramatic and 
violent events to present to their audience. Through this process the media inject the acts 
with even more fear and intimidation. 
A noticeable degree of the American mainstream media coverage of September 
11 focused on the responses of the George W. Bush Administration to the attacks. These 
responses concentrate on the need for preemptive military attacks, such as the Iraq War, 
and technologically-based U.S. military superiority as a mechanism for countering and 
Doris A. Graber, “Seeing is Remembering: How Visuals Contribute to 




limiting terrorist attacks.24 This approach is taken as opposed to developing a response to 
terrorism that reflects a more practical national security policy. The Bush 
Administration’s response is, however, applicable to the Hobbesian approach in the sense 
that in Hobbes's view it is human nature to engage in violence with perceived 
competitors.25 More specifically, violence provides a mechanism that allows for the 
ability of more powerful individuals to “make themselves masters of other men’s wives, 
children and [property] . .. ,26 Applying this Hobbesian concept to the concerns of this 
study reflects why some political actors would resort to political violence to achieve their 
97 
self-interested goals. 
The Relative Application of the Term “Terrorism” 
It is the pursuit of self-interested goals that lead actors to apply relativism to their 
consideration of the morality of the use of political violence. For example, the relative 
application of the definitions of who are terrorists and what constitutes a terrorist act is 
illustrated by John Exposito who points out that, “often the answer depends upon where 
one stands.”28 Exposito further states that political actors who challenge the authority of 
24 Jerry Harris, “Dreams of Global Hegemony and the Technology of War,” Race 
and Class 45, no. 2 (2003): 54-56. 
25 Hobbes, Leviathan, 83-84. 
26 Ibid, 83. 
27 Ibid. 
28 John Exposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 3d ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 280. 
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more dominant nation-states “are often portrayed as extremists.”29 According to 
Exposito, this characterization of certain actors as “extremists” leads to the labeling of 
their violent political actions by some as terrorism.30 
The relative meanings of what constitutes terrorist attacks are reflected in the 
subjective characterization of violent actions by the George W. Bush Administration 
since the September 11 attacks.31 This assertion is made because when the U.S., its 
allies, or its client states engage in political violence, it is not generally characterized as 
“terrorism” by the U.S. government or the American mainstream media. For instance, in 
1946, the U.S. government opened the School of the Americas, and through this 
apparatus the U.S. taught over 60,000 individuals from other countries how to effectively 
terrorize their populations in support of U.S. interests. Reportedly, many of the 
individuals that attended this school were taught how to “make war on their own 
people.” The School of the Americas indirectly represented the expression of state- 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 • Sam Gardiner, “Summary of a Study of Strategic Influence, Perception 
Management, Strategic Information Warfare and Strategic Psychological Operations in 
Gulf II (50 False Stories by the Bush Propaganda Machine),” [on-line resource] 
(Cambridge, England: Indy Media, accessed on 25 February 2004); available from 
http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0310gardiner. pdf; Internet. 
32 “A Brief (and partial) History of U.S. Sponsored Terrorism Abroad,” [on-line 
resource] (Artikel/Thema: International Door: From The Crows Eye, accessed 25 




sponsored terrorism on the part of the United States, where its allies in other countries 
facilitated political violence against political actors that were characterized as dangerous 
to American interests.34 What prevents the above-stated examples of U.S.-sponsored 
political violence from being labeled “terrorism”? One answer to this question is that the 
U.S. defines its interests as being associated with the political violence carried out by 
these actors. Therefore, a stamp of legitimacy is placed on political violence carried out 
by and/or supported by the U.S., and a stamp of illegitimacy is placed on political 
violence carried-out by actors not aligned with the interests of the U.S. 
Major Concepts 
The definition of the following concepts is critical to an understanding of the 
central research question for this study: To what extent does Hobbes’s egoistic state of 
nature explain the September 11 al Qaeda terrorist attacks? One major concept, Hobbes’s 
egoistic state of nature, is theoretically defined as: the conditions that would exist in the 
absence of sovereign political authority where individuals have the right to express their 
natural egoistic instincts (their human nature) consisting of unabated pursuit of self- 
• o c preservation, self-glorification, and self-interests in any manner they see fit. Implicit in 
the application of this definition to the central research problem is the assumption that the 
September 11 attacks represent a violent international conflict resulting from the 
anarchical conditions prevalent in a Hobbesian-type international state of nature. 
The phrase “September 11 attacks” refers to the hijacking of four commercial 
34~îbïZ 
35 Leslie Stephen, Hobbes (London: Macmillan & Co., 1904), 2. 
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airliners on September 11,2001, the subsequent terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center Towers in New York, the Pentagon in Washington D.C., and the attempted but 
failed crashing of a fourth plane into the White House. 
The term “al Qaeda,” which originally referred to as a place where new recruits of 
'1C. 
the Mujahadin or Mujahideen signed up for the Soviet-Afghanistan War, is an 
organization purportedly led by Osama, bin Laden (referred to in some print material as 
Usama). This study uses the “al Qaeda” spelling to refer to the organization and 
“Osama” to refer to bin Laden’s name. Al Qaeda has been characterized as a non-state, 
transnational, political organization that facilitates “terrorist” attacks in the global 
nn 
political arena. 
The definition of terrorist attacks and the characterization of who is a terrorist 
often dictate the mechanisms that various actors use to counteract terrorism. This study 
begins with the assumption that definitions of terrorist attacks are, in and of themselves, 
relative, and are based on the conception that “truth, itself, is relative to the standpoint of 
Dudley Knox Library - Terrorist Group Profiles, “Al-Qaida: Patterns of Global 
Terrorism, 2002: United States Department of State, April 2003,” [on-line resource] 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 2003, accessed 30 April 2003); 
available from http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/qaida.htm; Internet. 
nn 
Michael Collins Dunn, “Usama bin Laden: the Nature of the Challenge,” 
Journal of Middle East Policy 6, no. 26 (1998): 23-26 [journal on-line] and Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, “Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on America: Al-Qaida,” 
[on-line resource] (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002, 




the judging subject (‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’).” Therefore, the persons 
defining terrorist attacks may establish a set of subjective criteria for how a particular act 
is defined. For the purposes of this study, terrorist attacks are partly defined as the 
“purposeful creation of fear for coercive purposes.”39 Similarly, the notion of terrorism 
as used in this study is based on a concept attributed to former Secretary of State George 
Shultz, who “defined [terrorist attacks] ... as politically motivated violence intended to 
impose the terrorists’ will on a population or government;... it amounted to a form of 
warfare.” 40 This definition is applicable to this study because it characterizes terrorism 
as political violence, and draws a connection between terrorism and a general conception 
of war. 
A straight forward definition of war is provided by Clauswitz who defines it “as 
the continuation of politics by other means.”41 This statement by Clauswitz is not a 
complete summation of his theory of war. However, it is adequate for the purposes of 
deductively drawing a connection between wars, as intrinsically political acts, and 
terrorist attacks, such as the September 11 attacks, that are also intrinsically political acts. 
TO 
Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 326. 
39 Michael Stohl, “International Dimensions of State Terrorism,” in The State as 
Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression, ed. George A. 
Lopez and Michael Stohl (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), 44. 
40 Tucker, 52. 
41 David Chandler, “The Art of War on Land,” [resource on-line] (San Diego, CA: 
The Review of Arts, Literature, Philosophy and the Humanities, 2003, accessed 7 April 
2003); available from, http://www.ralphmag.org/CF/land-war.htm; Internet. 
15 
Based on this line of reasoning, terrorist attacks are conceived in this analysis as a form 
of warfare, and if war is the continuation of politics by other means, then by definition 
terrorist attacks must represent the continuation of politics by other means as well. 
Furthermore, if the above statement potentially contains some true elements, then it is 
reasonable that Clauswitz’s view regarding war as a tool of persuasion in the absence of 
non-violent mechanisms 42 is also applicable to a clear understanding of the reasons for 
terrorist attacks. 
Terrorist attacks include violent tactics designed to attack and destroy the 
infrastructure of a state or organization. These tactics extend to such techniques as 
“cyber-terrorism,”43 and the deployment of “chemical or biological agents,”44 which are 
used to threaten large populations and/or create an environment of fear among them. 
Moreover, terrorist attacks are carried out or sponsored by both state actors and 
non-state actors (transnational political groups and individuals engaging in political 
violence).45 There is a tendency to label political violence carried out by or sponsored by 
Western state actors as legitimate acts of war even when the end results are similar to the 
42 Ibid. 
43 Carol C. Dorsch and Glenn E. Schweitzer, Super Terrorism: Assassins, 
Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Plenum, 1998), 19-20. 
44 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass 
Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 67. 
45 Lopez and Stohl, 43. 
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impact and devastation of violence carried out by non-state actors.46 Non-state actors 
who carry out and/or sponsor terrorist acts in the global political arena are referred to as 
transnational terrorists.47 K. L. Oots defines transnational terrorists as political 
organizations or “groups whose goals include, but need not be limited to, the provision of 
public goods.” 
Because some transnational actors represent political organizations, their 
struggle for political power evolves as a major consideration in the 
analysis of their motivations. This study acknowledges the value of the 
concept of power, especially the notion of political power elaborated by 
Hans Morganthau: 
When we speak of power, we mean man’s control over the minds and 
actions of other men. By political we refer to the mutual relations of 
control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and 
the people at large.49 
Political power is further conceptualized in this study as extending beyond “the 
formal definition of political power as moving between state apparatuses, by recognizing 
other less official vectors of power, such as ‘transnational’ actors.”50 The conceptual 
dimensions of power, both domestically and internationally, refers to the disposition of a 
46 Ibid. 
47 Oots, 4. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
brief ed., rev. by Kenneth Thompson (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 30. 
50 Patricia Seed, "More Colonial and Postcolonial Discourses," Latin American 
Research Review 28 (1993): 147. 
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political structure.51 Non-state terrorists view themselves in a position subordinate to 
that of dominant, nation-state political actors, and acts of terrorism represent a means or 
vehicle for acting out of a particular sense of possibilities within perceived dimensions of 
power.52 
While non-state transnational actors increasingly represent major players in global 
relations the role of state actors in the causes of international terrorism cannot be ignored. 
The use of the term state in this study represents the adoption of the Hobbesian definition 
as designated in the terms “The Great Leviathan,” the civitas (loosely translated in Latin 
as commonwealth, and sovereign political authority. The state is further defined in this 
study as an agent for social organization.53 The difficulty in defining and conceptualizing 
the notion of the state lies in the breadth of frameworks54 reflecting various 
characterizations of the state or the nation-state. Any view regarding the state or nation¬ 
state, “in relation to Hobbesian theory, is that the state must be defined clearly enough to 
understand the individual’s relation to it (as in the relation between a citizen and the 
sovereign).”55 The state is further defined in this study as a structure that is “established 
51 Ryn, 1. 
52 Betts, 1. 
53 R .M. Maclver, The Modern State (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege/ Oxford 
University Press, 1947), vii. 
54 Rick Clifton Moore, "Hegemony, Agency and Dialectical Tension in Ellul’s 
Technological Society," Journal of Communication 48 (1998): 133. 
55 Ibid. 
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within society for the achievement of conscious and therefore limited purposes.”56 In 
addition, the state is conceptualized as being sovereign in nature.57 This definition of the 
state is in opposition to the existence of transnational groups such as A1 Qaeda, whose 
lack of sovereignty can actually be viewed as a strategic advantage. This is due to the 
fact that states or nation-states seeking retribution against transnational 
groups have no specific geographical area of sovereign land to attack in a retaliatory 
strike. 
Fredrick Engels, who conceptualizes the state apparatus as a "'medium' through 
which the interests of the ruling class are represented" provides an interesting and 
relevant contrast to Hobbes's definition of the state.58 However, contrasts are so stark 
that they contradict Hobbes’s definition of the state. Hobbes argues that the state 
apparatus is a medium for the establishment of sovereign political order, the protection of 
individuals from one another, and the protection from foreign invasion.59 The sovereign 
is the political power and authority within the state that is responsible for maintaining 
political and social order.60 This sovereign, political authority is established through the 
56 Maclver, 5-6. 
57 Ibid, 8-9. 
r o 
Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, Pre Capitalist Modes of Production (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 35. 




social contract and represents a mutual agreement between all rational individuals living 
in a state of nature that relative peace is preferable to a constant state of war.61 This 
relative peace represents the rational pursuit of self-interest, as conceptualized in a 
contract based on the idea that it is mutually beneficial for everyone to agree to give up 
hostilities in favor of peace.62 Hypothetically, extending this concept to an international 
sovereign, an international government, world polity, or world state conceivably would 
lead to a contract among various sovereign nation-states and transnational political actors 
to transfer some rights to an agreed upon global political authority.63 This international 
sovereign would have the political authority to keep the relative peace among 
international political actors.64 According to Mary Parker Follett: 
Whether we can have a lasting peace or not depends upon whether we 
have advanced far enough to be capable of loyalty to a higher unit, not as a 
substitute for our old patriotism to our country, but in addition to it. Peace 
will come by the group consciousness rising from the national to the 
international unit. This cannot be done through the imagination alone but 
needs actual experiments in world union, or rather experiments first in the 
union of two or more nations. Men go round lecturing to kind-hearted 
audiences and say, ‘Can you not be loyal to something bigger than a 
nation?’ And the kind-hearted audiences reply, ‘Certainly, we will now, at 
your very interesting suggestion, be loyal to a league of nations.’ But this 
61 Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (Oxford: 
Oxford University, 1999), 2 [database on-line]; available from Questia Digitized Library. 
62 Ibid. 
63 G. M. Tamâs, “Beyond the Nation State,” Social Research 63, no. 1 (1996): 
191. 
64 Mary Parker Follett, The New State: Group Organization the Solution of 
Popular Government (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1998), 348. 
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is only a wish on their part, its realization can never come by wishing but 
only by willing, and willing is a process, you have to put yourself in a 
certain place from which to will. We must, in other words, try experiments 
with a league of nations, and out of the actual life of that league will come 
loyalty to it. We are not ready for the life of the larger group because some 
teacher of ethics has taught us ‘to respect other men's loyalties.’ We are 
ready for it when our experience has incorporated into every tissue of our 
thought life [sic] the knowledge that we need other men’s loyalties. 
Loyalty, therefore, is not the chickens running back to the coop, also it is 
not a sentiment which we decide arbitrarily to adopt, it is the outcome of a 
process, the process of belonging.65 
In the absence of the adoption of sovereign political authority, a Hobbesian state 
of nature would exist among individuals where people “have the right to do anything they 
wish.”66 The international state of nature represents the conditions that exist within the 
international political arena wherein nation-states and non-state political actors have the 
right, in the absence of an international sovereign, to pursue their perceived interests in 
any manner they see fit.67 What this represents is a condition of anarchy within the 
global political arena.68 The concept global political arena or international political arena 
is used in a parallel fashion within this research. These concepts are defined as an 
ordering of global political actors within an international hierarchy of which dominance 
65 Ibid. 
66 Jessop, 18. 
67 A. C. Ewing, The Individual, The State and World Government (New York: 
The McMillan Co., 1947), 188. 
68 Ibid. 
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and subordination are key elements.69 It is this dominant and subordinate hierarchy 
within the anarchical international state of nature that makes political violence, such as 
war and terrorism, appear necessary.70 
The theoretical definitions of these major concepts provide the basis for 
exploration into the elements of the central research question that this study seeks to 
answer. The subsequent chapters of this study are designed to illustrate the reliability of 
deductive reasoning as a means for clarifying the validity of the stated assumption. 
Limitations and Outline of This Study 
Based on the central research question and the implicit hypothesis statement that 
the September 11 attacks were influenced by Hobbesian concepts embraced by al Qaeda, 
the limitations of this research are reflected in the narrow extent to which there is ease in 
applying the concepts of the Hobbesian state of nature and the egoistic nature of humans 
to the goals and objectives of al Qaeda in the facilitation of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks. This study does not seek to provide a critical analysis of the full scope of 
Hobbes’s political philosophy and the many logical and practical aspects of his theory, 
nor does it seek to point out logical inconsistencies in the structure of his theory. It is not 
intended to focus on al Qaeda per se, i.e., its organizational structure, how it recruits 
individuals, or the technical aspects of how it facilitates terrorist attacks. Furthermore, 
this study does not seek to provide a lengthy elaboration of the history of terrorism or an 
69 Peter Clark and Anthony Davis, “The Power of Dirt,” Canadian Review of 
Sociology and Anthropology 26 (1989): 651. 
70 Ibid. 
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extensive discussion of the varying categories of terrorism. These are not the focus of 
this study. 
Outline of Study 
This chapter explained the statement of the central research question and the 
implicit problem addressed by this study, the research design, and the theoretical 
framework and definitions of major concepts. Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant 
literature related to the central research question. Chapter 3 provides a descriptive 
analysis of Hobbes’s theory of the egoistic state of nature as outlined in Leviathan. 
Chapter 4 outlines the rationale behind the adoption of the Hobbesian theory of a state of 
nature and the egoistic conception of human nature, extended to international affairs, as a 
feasible explanation for the causes of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The conclusions 
offered in Chapter 5 provide a brief synopsis of the dissertation, which leads to a 
summation of the results of the research. 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
International Relations Theory 
Because this study involves an analysis of why a political phenomenon (the 
September 11 terrorist attacks) occurred in the international political arena, it is important 
to provide a survey of the applicable international relations literature. The breadth of 
international relations theories regarding the causes of conflict between international 
political actors is vast. Some international relations studies reflect the role of the state in 
causing violent conflict in the global political arena. Mark Lagon reasons that a 
significant number of contemporary international relations theories focus on the state and 
leaders of states as the major actors in international relations.1 Lagon's main focus is on 
political realists, their obsession with the state and the limitations of the realist model in 
terms of the realities that evolved after the Cold War. In regards to the state, Rick 
Clifton Moore, in “Hegemony, Agency and Dialectical Tension in Ellul’s Technological 
Society,” illustrates the fact that defining the state is difficult because of 
1 Mark P. Lagon, “Alternatives to Structural Realism: International Relations after 




the multiplicity of frameworks and theories that pervade conceptualizations regarding it.3 
Authors Demko and Wood also take on the task of defining the state. They see the state 
arising from a conceptualization of international relations “that is made up of discrete 
nations, each of which could be given its own autonomous territory.”4 This view reflects 
the realities of the emergence of European states as the dominant force in the 
international political order but does not account for non-European political actors or 
transnational political actors.5 Shlomo Ben-Ami, argues that the state reflects the role of 
nationalism in the development of modem political authority.6 Seth Asumah, on the 
other hand, focuses on the definition of the state as it applies to the state apparatus in 
Africa and the often unique nature of policy shifts on that Continent.7 Nevertheless, 
Asumah provides a good structural definition for a generic characterization of the state. 
o 
R. M. Maclver provides an outline of the state in his work entitled The Modern State. 
3 Rick Clifton Moore, “Hegemony, Agency and Dialectical Tension in Ellul's 
Technological Society,” Journal of Communication 48, no. 3 (1998): 133. 
4 George J. Demko and William B. Wood, Reordering the World: Geopolitical 
Perspectives on the Twenty-First Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 228. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Shlomo Ben-Ami, ed., introduction to Ethnic Challenges to the Modern Nation- 
State, ed. Yoav Peled and Alberto Spektorowski (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 1. 
7 eth Asumah, “The Nation-State and Public Policy in Africa: Reconsidering the 
Effects of Structural Variables and Systemic Dynamics,” Western Journal of Black 
Studies 22(1998): 1. 
8 R. M. Maclver, The Modern State (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 
1947), vii. 
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Specifically, Maclver defines the evolution and role of the state.9 In terms of the 
evolution of the state, Hardin and Hirst, in Pre Capitalist Modes of Production, outline 
the stages of the various modes of production as they relate to the evolution and role of 
the state as a political instrument and structure serving the interests of the ruling 
economic class.10 Specifically, this book posits that the state evolved based on changes 
in the economic mode of production of various societies. All of the above sources are 
used to establish the predominant role of the state, a sovereign political entity 
representing a body of people—a society—in a particular territory that is conscious of its 
identity, in international relations theory. 
The preoccupation with giving the state so much attention within many 
international relations frameworks, as noted by Lagon, tends to negate “the roles of 
transnational [or non state],. . actors and of ideas in world politics.”11 Miles Kahler 
points out that the emergence of transnational political actors requires theoretical 
conceptions that look beyond interstate conflict.12 Janos Kis, in “Beyond the Nation¬ 
state,” argues that political analysis must take into account such central factors as 
ethnicity, and that states must cope with transnationalism as an emerging phenomenon 
9 Ibid. 
10 Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (London: 
Routledge and K. Paul, 1975), 1-20 passim. 
11 Lagon, 68. 
12 Miles Kahler “Inventing International Relations: International Relations 
Theory After 1945,” in New Thinking in International Relations Theory, ed. Michael W. 
Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 33-35. 
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that may compete with the political power of the state.13 G. M. Tamâs also identifies the 
role and importance of ethnicity and transnationalism in political affairs.14 Implicit in the 
arguments of Kis and Tamâs is the point that non-state actors, thus non-state actors, are 
becoming integral parts of international affairs.15 
For the purposes of the theoretical concerns of this study a connection between 
non-state, transnational political actors and global terrorism is critical. Oots, for example, 
characterizes transnational terrorist groups as non-state actors who operate as interest 
groups and who have specific goals and objectives.16 As political transnational 
organizations continue to become more important actors in international relations, they 
interact more and more with states.17 Ivo D. Duchacek points out those interactions 
between transnational groups and states are characteristically different from traditional 
1 o 
interstate relations. 
13 Janos Kis, “Beyond the Nation-state,” Social Research 63, no. 1 (1996): 194. 
14 G. M. Tamâs, “Ethnarchy and Ethno-Anarchism,” Social Research 63, no. 1 
(1996): 171-172. 
15 Kent Layne Oots, A Political Organization Approach to Transnational 
Terrorism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ivo D. Duchacek, The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among and 
Across Nations (Westview Press, 1986), 208. 
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Both state and non-state political actors represent key players in the global 
political arena. A. C. Ewing focuses on the relationship between the individual as a 
political actor and the state as a political actor.19 Ewing defines the international state of 
nature as a set of conditions that exist within the international political order wherein 
states, as well as non-state political actors, have the right, in the absence of an 
international sovereign, to pursue their interests in any manner they see fit. 
This unabated pursuit of interests within the global political arena leads to an 
71 
international political order that reflects a “dominant-subordinate [s/c] hierarchy.” 
Clark and Davis put forth the position that this hierarchy establishes “the dominant 
[political power] with a means to distinguish itself from the subordinate while also 
providing the dominant with a device to control and manage dominant-subordinate [s/c] 
relations.” While the focus of this position is on domestic societies, extrapolating this 
concept to international relations provides one view for understanding how dominant 
political actors, such as the United States, exercise power over subordinate political 
actors. 
19 A. C. Ewing, The Individual, the State and World Government (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), 1-8. 
20 Ibid., 188. 
21 Peter Clark and Anthony Davis, “The Power of Dirt: An Exploration of Secular 
Defilement in Anglo-Canadian Culture,” Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology 26, no. 4 (1989): 651. 
22 Ibid. 
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World Politics: Trend and Transformation, by Kegley and Wittkopf, highlights 
the relationship between Hobbes’s political conceptualizations and the nature of 
international affairs.23 This book provides an overview of the spectrum of global political 
activities, designated as international relations, delineating important theoretical 
perspectives and trends.24 The relationship between Hobbes’s political philosophy and 
international relations is further illustrated by Murphy in his essay, “The Grotian Vision 
of World Order.”25 This journal article explains how the implications of Hobbes’s and 
Spinoza’s political conceptions affect the character of international relations theory. It 
focuses upon the need for an international sovereign to regulate conflict in the global 
political arena. This article further highlights the theory of the Dutch humanist Huig de 
Groot, or Grotius, who sought to develop “a general theory of law that he hoped would 
bring order out of the chaos of international conflict.”28 
9 T 
Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and 
Transformation, 7th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s/Worth, 1999). 
24 Ibid. 
9 S • 
Cornelius F. Murphy, “The Grotian Vision of World Order,” American Journal 
of International Law 76, no. 3 (1982): 7-9. 
26 Ibid., 484. 
27 Ibid., 477. 
28 Ibid., 480. 
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Equally important, David Boucher’s analysis in Political Theories of 
International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present, seeks to draw a connection 
between classical and contemporary international relations theory. Boucher provides a 
comparison between the Hobbesian approach to international relations (as represented in 
classical realism) with the contemporary realist approach as delineated in modern 
international relations theory.30 One important element of the contemporary realist 
approach is the concept of balance of power as delineated by Hans Morganthau, whose 
concept of balance of power is based on the existence of conditions in the global political 
arena where actors pursue the interests of their states based on the respective power 
T 1 
abilities (the capacities of states to pursue their self-interests) This view is reflected by 
Alfonso Gonzalez who points out that contemporary balance of power politics evolved 
out of the conflict between European states and culminated in the bipolarization of the 
post World War II global structure.32 
Hobbes, International Anarchy, and the International State of Nature 
The contemporary realist model takes many of Hobbes’s basic premises and 
applies them to modem international relations. For example, realist Kenneth Waltz 
David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From 
Thucydides to the Present (Oxfoxd: Oxford University Press, 1998), 11. 
30 Ibid., 1-17, passim. 
”5 1 
Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
brief and rev. ed., ed. Kenneth Thompson (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 183-186. 
Alfonso Gonzalez, ed., introduction to The New Third World, ed. Jim Norwine 
(Boulder: Perseus Publishing, 1998), 3. 
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provides a highly relevant analysis of human nature as it relates to international conflict. 
Waltz points out that the state-of-war conditions that exist in international relations are 
directly related to human behavior.34 If this is the case, then international conflict is 
analogous to Hobbes’s state of nature and consequently represents an international state 
of nature. 
What, then, is the proof for the existence of the international state of nature? Jahn 
Beate presents one argument for the existence of the international state of nature. ' Beate 
argues that in the absence of an international sovereign, relations between global political 
actors are congruent to the relations of groups in “primitive” societies that have no 
definitive sovereign political authority.36 Similarly, Morganthau delineates the 
relationship between the state-of-nature conditions that exist in primitive societies and 
those that exist in the global political arena.37 These conceptualizations share the 
Hobbesian view that primitive societies—in the absence of sovereign political authority— 
33 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001), 16-42 passim. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Jahn Beate, The Cultural Construction of International Relations: The 
Invention of the State of Nature (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 151-153. 
36 Ibid., 151-153. 
37 Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Pow’er and 
Peace, rev., ed. Kenneth Thompson (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 255, quoted in Jahn 
Beate, The Cultural Construction of International Relations: The Invention of the State of 
The State of Nature (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 151-153. 
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are equivalent to the conditions prevalent in the global political arena in terms of 
intergroup conflict. For example, Morganthau offers a descriptive analysis of two 
primitive groups, the Australian Aborigines and the Yurok Native American tribes of 
California, to parallel the political conditions of these groups to the conditions prevalent 
in the international state of nature.38 
Hidemi Suganmi, contends that Hugo Grotius provides further argument for the 
existence of the international state of nature. Suganmi points out that actors 
participating in the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international state of nature 
are subject to the same egoistic tendencies as individuals in the state of nature. 40 
Moreover, David P. Fidler and Stanley Hoffmann illustrate that human political actors, 
through the political institutions or political organizations that they represent, express 
certain egoistic tendencies.41 These authors posit that in the absence of an international 
political sovereign, these egoistic tendencies are expressed rightly and freely.42 
Similarly, Hoffmann, in Gulliver's Troubles: Or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy, 
38 Ibid. 
TO 
Hidemi Suganmi, “Grotius and International Equality,” in Hugo Grotius and 
International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 228. 
40 Ibid. 
41 David P. Fidler and Stanley Hoffmann, ed., introduction to Rousseau on 
International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), xlv. 
42 Ibid. 
extends this argument by pointing out that in international relations these egoistic 
tendencies reflect a “fragmentation”43 of solidarity among global political actors. 
Likewise, Raymond Aron agrees that the global political arena represents conditions 
where no sovereign authority is in place.44 Dennis Pirages, in “The Origins of 
Ecopolitics: The Impending Revolution,” draws a similar definitive connection between 
Hobbes’s state of nature and the international state of nature.45 In like manner, Bowie 
and Simon argue that, based on the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international 
state of nature, no political actor (either state or non-state) can be expected to act in any 
other manner other than what is in its perceived self-interest.46 
Such actions on the part of global political actors, are characterized as rights 
(irazôn de estad/raison d'état) in the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international 
state of nature.47 Friedrich Meinecke and Douglas Scott identify this right or “necessity 
43 Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles; Or, the Setting of American Foreign 
Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 323. 
44 Raymond Aron, “The Anarchical Order of Power,” Daedalus 124, no. 3 (1995) 
27-30. 
45 Dennis Pirages, "The Origins of Ecopolitics: The Impending Revolution,” in 
Toward a Just World Order, ed. Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1982 ), 474. 
46 Norman E. Bowie and Robert L. Simon, The Individual and the Political 
Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy, 2d. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1986), 233-234. 
47 Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D'Aetat and Its 
Place in Modern History, trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1957), 5. 
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of state” (as explicated in Chapter 4) the rights of global actors to exhibit behaviors only 
limited by their dimensions of power and abilities in the international state of nature. In 
addition, Perry suggests that all global actors will take actions that are in their perceived 
self-interests.49 The concept of the right or necessity of state also involves the issue of 
the nature of the behavior of human political actors.50 Gibney postulates that human 
political actors that operate in the international state of nature have no moral 
responsibilities beyond those that represent the pursuit of their own interests.51 
Another argument for the existence of the international state of nature becomes 
apparent when John Rawls’ “original position”52 postulation is extended to international 
affairs. Toward that end, Thomas Franck deduces that if Rawls’ original position were 
applied to the realities of international relations, then it would logically lead to a 
conception of the world similar to that of a Hobbesian notion of an international state of 
nature.53 
48_lbiT 
49 Ralph Barton Perry, Present Conflict of Ideals: A Study of the Philosophical 
Background of the World War (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1922), 276. 
50 Mark Gibney, Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political 
Issues (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 73. 
51 Ibid. 
52 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard, 1999), 52- 
53. 
53 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 220-221. 
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Conceptualizing a Hobbesian notion of an international state of nature is 
dependent on an understanding of Hobbes’s concept of equality. According to Hobbes, 
the relative equality of both individuals and political actors is a major cause of violent 
conflict.54 Reflecting on this notion, George Soros (founder of the Open Society 
Institute), suggests that the international political arena is analogous to George Orwell’s 
Animal Farm, wherein the animals represent political actors and there exists a hierarchy 
of equals.55 Similarly, Dickinson suggests that the hierarchy that exists in international 
relations represents an unequal alliance between various political actors.56 In the current 
arena of world politics, the United States is the actor that, to a large degree, controls this 
unequal alliance of hierarchical actors, or what MacLeod refers to as a “community of 
interests.”57 Everett Hagen posits that this community of interests (or unequal alliance of 
hierarchical actors) is not only hierarchical but also exclusive, in that it excludes some 
54 Boucher, 147. 
55 George Soros, “America’s Global Role: Why the Fight for a Worldwide Open 
Society Begins at Home,” [magazine on-line] (Boston: The American Prospect, June 
2003, accessed 5 July 2003); available from 
http://www.soros.org/gsbio/american_prospect_052703.htm; Internet. 
56 Edwin Dewitt Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 50. 
57 William Christie MacLeod, The Origin and History of Politics (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1931), 5. 
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actors out of the community.58 This exclusion of some actors by a dominant community 
of interests, according to Hagen, leads to acrimoniousness and ultimately desperate and 
radical behavior on the part of the excluded actors.59 
Another important element in understanding the relevance of Hobbes’s 
conception of an international state of nature lies in his elaboration of the concept of 
relativism. R. M. Hare provides an analysis of the nature of moral relativism.60 His view 
coincides with Hobbes’s conception of relativism (Hobbes’s believes that there is no 
moral objectivity) in terms of the role of perception in establishing ethical principles.61 
Ivo D. Duchacek further extends the concept of relativism as it applies to the study of 
international relations. In his book, The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among 
and Across Nations, he argues that within some international relations theories there is a 
focus on the relative application of “whether there should be a difference between moral 
standards applying to an individual, acting on his or her behalf, and those applying to a 
king, prince, or statesman, acting on behalf of a territorial community.”62 This issue is 
parallel to the previously noted idea of reason or necessity of state. Toward that end, 
58 Everett E. Hagen, “A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political 
Change,” in Readings in Modern Political Analysis, ed. Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. 
Neubauer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 188-189. 
59 Ibid. 
60 R. M. Hare, Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 5. 
61 
62 Duchacek, 43 
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Meinecke and Scott postulate that “state interest and self-interest were [.s /c] in essence 
identical.”63 
Hobbes’s Political Philosophy 
Hobbes's political philosophy has been extensively studied and analyzed. Some of 
these studies have focused on the use of Hobbesian political theory as an explanatory tool 
for evaluating the causes of violence and conflict among individuals and political actors. 
The clearest outline of Hobbesian political philosophy is provided in Leviathan 
where Hobbes establishes the completeness of his political theory illustrating his concept 
of egoistic human nature, the state of nature, and the necessity of political authority.64 
Leviathan is used in this study to provide a basis for understanding Hobbes’s conception 
of the state of nature and the role of certain egoistic tendencies in promoting conflict and 
violence. 
One relevant study of Hobbes’s political philosophy, by T. E. Jessop, highlights 
the influence of the English Civil War on Hobbes’s ideas.65 The state-of- war conditions 
of this conflict influenced the nature and content of Leviathan,66 Jessop discusses the 
63 Meinecke and Scott, 68. 
64 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Forme & Power of a 
Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. Alfred Rayney Waller (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1904), xiii-xiv. 
65 T. E. Jessop, Thomas Hobbes (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1960), 18. 
66 Ibid., 18. 
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Hobbesian view of egoistic human nature,67 and provides a descriptive analysis of 
Hobbes’s philosophy from the standpoint that it represents a “system” (in terms of a 
structured set of assumptions).68 
In Hobbes and His Critics, Bowie points out that Hobbes challenged the 
contemporary philosophical and political norms of his time.69 Bowie focuses on the 
effect of Hobbes’s philosophy on European intellectual thought and illustrates the 
response Hobbes’s philosophy drew from the intellectual and academic community of the 
time.70 Many of the initial responses to Hobbes's political philosophy were negative and 
in some circles his ideas were considered dangerous.71 The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy states that Hobbes's ideas at one point even had a damaging affect on the 
personal lives and careers of some of those who supported his theory or who positively 
evaluated it.72 This book provides analyses of the conceptualizations of important 
political philosophers from Plato to Nietzsche. 
67 Ibid., 18-19. 
68 Ibid., 8. 
69 John Bowie, Hobbes and His Critics (London: Jonathon Cape, 1951), 13. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ted Honderich, editor, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 653. 
72 Ibid., 653. 
73 Ibid., viii. 
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In the Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism 
and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Samuel I. Mintz, in a manner similar to 
Bowie’s, sets out to describe the reactions to Hobbes's philosophy during Hobbes’s 
lifetime and provides a well-defined orientation regarding the main influences on 
Hobbes's intellectual thought.74 Mintz points out that Hobbes was well versed in Latin 
and Greek and identifies the influence of his reading and subsequent translation of the 
Latin versions of the Peloponnesian War and the Melian Dialog on the development of 
Hobbes’s political philosophy.75 Mintz also establishes the influence of Euclid geometry 
on the structure of Hobbes's intellectual thought.76 Congruent to the evaluation by Mintz, 
scholar D. G. James further elaborates on the intellectual influences of Hobbes, 
discussing the effects of the theories of Mersenne, Descartes, and Galileo on the nature of 
Hobbes’s philosophy and structure of his political theory.77 James further states that 
70 
Hobbes was exposed to a classical education, one founded in Greek science and logic. 
Hobbes continuously drew upon many of these academic and intellectual influences in 
74 Samuel I. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to 
the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (England: Cambridge at the 
University Press, 1970), 1-6. 
75 Ibid., 5. 
76 Ibid., 6. 
77 D. G. James, The Life of Reason: Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbroke (London: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1949), 2. 
78 Ibid., ix. 
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formulating his political and philosophical conceptions. James highlights the fact that 
Hobbes's theory was an important part of the Age of Reason and the Age of Neo- 
classicism. 79 
The formulation of Hobbes’s political and philosophical conceptions reflects the 
structure of his methodology, which was designed to yield correct conclusions via its 
morphology.80 R. E. Ewin points out that the structure of Hobbes’s methodology can be 
seen throughout his theory.81 Furthermore, Ewin outlines the concepts of morality and 
ethics in Hobbes’s philosophy, highlighting the role of his methodology in the 
implications of his moral and ethical theory. Ewin also illustrates the connection 
between Hobbes’s ethical conceptions and how these lead to the ultimate conclusion of 
his political theory, which is represented in the idea of the state of nature. Understanding 
Hobbes's methodology is the key to deciphering his political philosophy. Toward that 
end, Howard Warrender’s “Editor’s Introduction” to the Latin version of De Cive is an 
79 Ibid. 
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R. E. Ewin, Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 17-18. 
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excellent descriptive summary of Hobbes's methodology as it relates to his political 
OT 
philosophy. 
While some scholars have focused on the relationship between Hobbes's 
methodology and his political philosophy, others have focused on the relationship 
between his philosophical conceptions and his political theory. Leo Strauss, who 
delineates the various themes in Hobbes's philosophy, which culminate in his political 
theory, provides one relevant excursion into this area.84 Strauss notes that Hobbes was 
• QC motivated to develop a political sociology regarding the nature of social order. Strauss’ 
overall focus is to provide a descriptive analysis of Hobbes’s philosophy. 
The complexity of Hobbes’s overall philosophy is not lost on the political 
philosopher Spinoza. Spinoza extends major concepts in Hobbes's political philosophy 
• • • within his own conceptualizations. Frederick Pollock outlines the connection between 
Hobbes’s political theory and Spinoza's in Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy. Pollock’s 
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book identifies the similarities between the political philosophies of Hobbes and 
Spinoza.87 
One element of similarity that Spinoza shared with Hobbes was an understanding 
of the role of human nature in political actions. Hobbes’s concept of human nature 
focuses on the expression of egoistic behavior.88 Howard Warrender elaborates on the 
role of Hobbes’s egoistic analysis of human nature and its role in the development of 
social order and obligation.89 Additionally, Warrender points out that it is the egoistic 
tendencies prevalent in human nature that lead to the necessity of social obligation.90 
Hobbes's ideas regarding ethics and morality are reflected in his theory of social 
obligation.91 In A Short History of Ethics, Greek and Modern, Rogers surveys ethical 
theory from the Sophists to English Rational Idealism, identifying natural human egoistic 
tendencies as the basis of Hobbes's ethical theory and, ultimately, his concept of social 
obligation.92 Consistent with Warrender, Richard Tuck illustrates the Hobbesian concept 
87 Ibid. 
88 Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of 
Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 13-29 passim. 
89 Ibid., 2. 
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91 Reginald A. P. Rogers, A Short History of Ethics, Greek and Modern (London: 
Macmillan, 1911), 257. 
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of egoistic human nature, ethics, and social/political order.93 In Hobbes, Leslie Stephen 
also discusses Hobbes's theory of the egoistic nature of humans and how human nature 
leads to the state of nature.94 Stephen establishes a structured, descriptive analysis of 
Hobbes’s overall philosophy and identifies key elements in Hobbes's political theory.95 
Likewise, in Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary 
Explanation Anthony O'Hear discusses the role of egoism and human nature in Hobbes's 
political philosophy.96 O'Hear suggests that if something is perceived as pleasurable, 
then it is by definition good.97 Projecting this conceptualization to Hobbes’s political 
philosophy leads to the following proposition: if a thing is good, then it is in an 
individual’s best interest.98 O’Hear’s overall focus centers on the role of evolution in 
determining egoism in human nature.99 Similarly, in Why Be Moral? The Egoistic 
Challenge, John Van Ingen identifies the various distinctions of self-interested behavior 
93 Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1989), vii- 
xviii. 
94 Leslie Stephen, Hobbes (London: Macmillan & Co., 1904), 2. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Anthony O'Hear, Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of 
Evolutionary Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 111. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., vii. 
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as a designation of egoistic tendencies.100 Van Ingen focuses on the various theories and 
conceptualizations that utilize the egoist perspective.101 
In addition to egoistic-based self-interest, Hobbes identifies competitiveness as a 
major egoistic tendency that is prevalent in human nature. In a like manner, Bernard 
Campbell's study of the role of the ideas of Wallace and Malthus about population 
corresponds to the Hobbesian conception of the competition for limited resources in the 
state of nature.102 Additionally, Campbell analyzes the role of Darwinian evolutionary 
theory based on a geographical and regional “ecology model.”103 Campbell’s book is 
used in this study to illustrate the competitive nature of the evolutionary process, and his 
perspective unwittingly supports the Hobbesian concept of a natural competition among 
individuals.104 In his writings on population, Malthus also discusses the competition for 
limited resources and its connection to population growth. 105 Furthermore, O’Hear also 
100 John Van Ingen, Why Be Moral? The Egoistic Challenge (New York: Peter 
Lang Publishing, 1994), 39. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Bernard Campbell, Human Ecology: The Story of Our Place in Nature from 
Prehistory to the Present, 2d. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995), 4. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., 5. 
105 T. R. Malthus, Parallel Chapters from the First and Second Editions of an 
Essay on the Principle of Population (New York: Macmillan, 1895), 9. 
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focuses on the connection of human evolution to the conditions of human nature.106 
The State of Nature and the Hobbesian Social Contract 
The analysis of the role of evolution in the competitive aspect of egoistic human 
nature is relevant because (in Hobbesian political theory) it is these conditions that lead to 
the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the state of nature. In the state of nature, a state 
of war would naturally exist because everyone would have the right to do whatever he or 
she wants.107 Bertrand Russell, for example, establishes that a state of war would 
naturally exist because each individual would feel threatened by every other individual.108 
Additionally, Russell gives an analysis of the state of nature.109 Russell’s outline of 
conceptions of the state of nature contrasts with the Hobbesian state of nature.110 
Similarly, Jean Hampton outlines the various causes of conflict in the state of nature and 
analyzes the applicability of Hobbes’s solution as a mechanism to limit this conflict.111 
106 O'Hear, 111. 
107 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and 
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Hobbes’s state of the nature is characterized by equality. Toward that end, T. V. 
Smith identifies that the Hobbesian state of nature is based on the relative equality of 
individuals.112 According to Hobbes, the reality of the concept of equality and the 
overwhelming egoistic tendencies of human nature result in the state-of-war conditions 
found in the state of nature.113 
i 
According to Hobbes, the only way to end the state of nature is through the social 
contract, which is an agreement between competing individuals.114 Individuals in the 
state of nature rationalize that the mutual advantage of agreeing to the contract is more 
beneficial than the conditions of the state of nature.115 In Liberalism, Constitutionalism 
and Democracy, Russell Hardin illustrates that Hobbes's social contract is an example of 
mutual advantage.116 Additionally, Hardin argues that the idea of mutual advantage is 
based on the democratic principle of popular consent and only works because it can be 
• 117 
demonstrated to be in the self-interest of all or most of the members of a given society. 
112 T. V. Smith, The American Philosophy of Equality (Chicago: The University 
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Likewise, David Gauthier argues that mutual agreement is a basis for right society 
and constitutes a moral foundation upon which correct principals of society are 
1 1 o 
established. Gauthier points out that a mutually beneficial contract between competing, 
self-interested parties can be the basis for the best possible political authority.119 
Correspondingly, Simon Blackburn defines the social contract and delineates the specific 
character of the Hobbesian social contract.120 Likewise, in “Social Contract or Social 
Covenant,” Jonathan Sacks illustrates the logic behind the social contract. Sacks 
provides an analysis of Hobbes’s conception of the social contract as compared to other 
social contract theories. 
Political Violence, War, and Terrorism 
Chapter 1 defined terrorism as a form of political violence. The relevant literature 
regarding the specific character of political violence perpetuated as terrorism reflects 
studies regarding the causes, nature, goals, and consequences of terrorism and leads to an 
understanding of various relevant definitions of terrorist acts. Because of the political 
118 David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, England: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 9-11. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Simon Blackburn, TheOxford Dictionary of Philosphy (Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 354. 
121 Ibid., 354. 
122 Ibid. 
nature of terrorism, difficulties arise in objectively analyzing the concept, both 
theoretically and practically. This study begins the analysis of terrorism by defining 
political violence. 
Toward that end, Eugene J. Meehan in Contemporary Political Thought provides 
one approach relevant to conceptualizing political violence.123 Meehan’s work identifies 
the various theoretical ideas behind the phenomenon of political violence.124 
Historically, political violence, inclusive of terrorism, has been used as a mechanism to 
achieve political objectives. One type of political violence that is used to achieve 
political objectives is war. As noted earlier, Lawsuits conceptualizes war is being simply 
an extension of politics through violence. Correspondingly, Emmanuel Sivan, in “The 
Mythologies of Religious Radicalism: Judaism and Islam,” argues that non-conventional 
warfare, such as terrorism, is a political act and represents political violence in the same 
sense as conventional warfare. 
123 
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The issue of using political violence as a means to achieve political ends is taken 
up by Kelman.127 Kelman focuses on the role of war and political violence as a 
mechanism for achieving political objectives.128 Yet another scholar, Karma Nabulisi, 
argues that the “institutionalization” of political violence by societies is largely based on 
a type of “moral relativism” that is centered on the following principles: (a) if our 
society, state, or group carries out political violence against others, then we are justified 
and right; however, (b) if another society, state, or group carries out political violence 
against us then they are not justified and consequently are wrong.129 Nabulsi focuses on 
the contradictions in theses principles in his explanatory analysis regarding the nature and 
causes of war.130 
The type of moral relativism noted above, as applied to the facilitation of political 
violence, is congruent to Hobbes's concept of the relative nature of right and wrong and 
good and bad. Furthermore, moral relativism is used by al Qaeda, the G. W. Bush 
Administration, and elements within the American mainstream media to justify the 
respective use of political violence. 
127 Herbert C. Kelman “Internationalizing Military Force,” in Preventing World 
War: Some Proposals, ed. Morton Deutsch, William M. Evan, and Quincy Wright (New 
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The use of moral relativism as a mechanism to justify political violence is further 
illustrated by John Exposito.131 Exposito points out that the characterization of what 
defines political violence as terrorism is determined by who is doing the 
characterizing. For example, there is a reasonable chance that an Israeli government 
official would probably consider political violence carried out against Israeli civilians as 
terrorism. Conversely, there is a reasonable chance that a member of HAMAS (the 
Palestinian based Islamic resistance movement) would probably consider this same attack 
a legitimate opposition action as opposed to a terrorist attack. 
How definitions are applied to political violence can represent the relative 
application of this violence toward political actions. For example, in “A Time to Break 
Silence,” Martin Luther King, Jr. identifies the contradictions presented through the use 
of political violence by the U.S. in the Vietnam War.133 Similarly, the School of the 
Americas indirectly represents the expression of state sponsored political violence on the 
part of the United States through the training of its allies in other countries to facilitate 
131 Exposito, 280. 
132 Ibid. 
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Martin Luther King, Jr., “A Time to Break Silence,” in I Have A Dream: 
Writings and Speeches that Changed the World, ed. James M. Washington (San 
Francisco: Harper, 1986), 135. 
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political violence against political actors that are deemed antithetical to American 
• 134 interests. 
Examples such as these illustrate how the United States government applies the 
term terrorism in a relative manner. Elements within the mainstream media also respond 
to the relative use of the term terrorism. In the journal article “Seeing is Remembering: 
How Visuals Contribute to Learning from Television News,” Doris A. Graber focuses on 
the role of the media in shaping public opinion.135 Graber points out that the media is not 
fundamentally objective in its shaping of public opinion.136 The shaping of public 
opinion by the media in determining what is terrorism is essential in characterizing 
terrorist acts as a form of political violence.137 One author that delineates this reality is 
Richard Schaffert, who points out that “acts of terrorism are attributed to literally every 
known source of political violence.”138 
134 “A Brief (and partial) History of U.S. Sponsored Terrorism Abroad,” [on-line 
resource] (Artikel/Thema: International Door: From The Crows Eye, accessed 25 
February 2004); available from http://www.stelling.nl/konfront/3e2001/12801 .html; 
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Another more general approach to understanding conflict facilitated as political 
violence is to carry out an historical, teleological analysis of conflict facilitated as 
political violence. For example, some scholars, such as Peter Jones and Andrew S. 
Skinner, argue that by extending Adam Smith’s four-stage approach to an historical 
analysis of intergroup violence it is possible to understand the role of this violence in the 
evolution of international conflict.139 For example, as groups evolved through stages, 
according to Jones and Skinner, group identity increased and subsequently the level of 
conflict also increased. Extrapolating this premise to the realities of transnational actors 
acting out in the global political arena, Susanne Rudolph argues that these actors offer a 
certain sub-national group identity that in some instances supercedes that of states.140 
Historically, analyzing the causes of conflict facilitated as political violence helps 
in accomplishing the daunting task of defining terrorism. By initially defining terrorism 
as an intrinsically political act, this study can begin the task of delineating the differences 
between various types of terrorism. This study identifies two types of terrorism: state 
terrorism and non-state terrorism. The latter is the major focus of this study because it 
reflects the political violence of transnational organizations such as al Qaeda. 
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Michael Stohl characterizes state terrorism in The State as Terrorist: The 
Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression,141 Stohl characterizes the role of 
the state in facilitating political violence and defines the concept of state terrorism as the 
use of terrorism by state actors in the pursuit of "domestic and international interests.”142 
While the concept of state terrorism is an important element in an understanding 
of terrorism, transnational terrorism is the focus of this study. Carol C. Dorsch and Glenn 
E. Schweitzer characterize transnational terrorism as an escalation in the nature and 
strategy of terrorist attacks, including cyber-terrorism.143 In their book, Super Terrorism: 
Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dorsch and Schweitzer suggest 
that transnational terrorist activities in some instances involve various criminal activities 
such as money laundering and illegal arms transactions.144 Similarly, in The New 
Terrorism, by Walter Laqueur, the author adds the deployment of chemical and 
biological agents to the list of methods used by transnational terrorists.145 
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The expansion of the methods and techniques of non-state terrorists has forced 
state actors to reevaluate their approach to the counter-terrorism measures that they take. 
David Tucker notes in his book, entitled Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United 
States and International Terrorism, the importance of the U.S. confronting terrorism if it 
intends to maintain and extend its hegemonic dominance of international relations.146 
This reference identifies the importance of defining terrorism in a practical way as a basis 
for combating it.147 Additionally, Tucker provides a case study of U.S. involvement in 
Bosnia and discusses an increase in Islamic based global terrorism against the U.S. 
Another scholar, Richard K. Betts, posits a theory of terrorism in which he argues 
that the strategy of transnational terrorists is to use the overwhelming power of dominant 
state actors like the U.S. as a “tactical advantage”148 for the purpose of initiating a power 
struggle against them. In his article “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical 
Advantages of Terror,” Betts points out that political violence in the form of terrorism 
involves a strategy designed to compete against the overwhelming power of the U.S.149 
This idea of terrorism as a power achieving mechanism designed to compete with the 
overwhelming power of the U. S. is further reflected in Claes G. Ryn’s analysis in 
146 David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and 
International Terrorism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), 51-53. 
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“Dimensions of Power: The Transformation of Liberalism and the Limits of'Politics.”150 
Ryn attempts to show that the character of terrorist acts carried out by transnational 
organizations is an attempt to compete within its limited dimensions of power against 
more powerful actors.151 
The relationship between competition for political power and terrorism is the key 
to understanding political violence such as the September 11 attacks. In Black Power 
Ideologies: An Essay in African-American Political Thought, John T. McCartney 
outlines the nature of political power and the competition for it.152 This source is used in 
the present study to conceptualize power by looking at the way subordinate groups view 
power acquisition when faced with overwhelming force from a dominant power 
structure.153 In a similar vein, Patricia Seed provides a definition for power applicable to 
this study by “recognizing other less official vectors of power.”154 
150 Claes G. Ryn “Dimensions of Power: The Transformation of Liberalism and 
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Al Qaeda 
Al Qaeda represents a weaker political actor attempting to compete within its 
limited dimensions of power against a dominant actor (the U.S.). Placed within a 
Hobbesian framework, this conception provides the basis for understanding the causes of 
terrorist acts such as the September 11 attacks. Terrorism has provided the mechanism 
for al Qaeda to emerge as a major political actor and to accomplish some of its stated 
goals. In the article "al Qaeda (The Base),” author John Pike defines the nature, 
character, objectives, and goals of the al Qaeda network.155 The article, “Special Section: 
Terrorist Attacks on America - al Qa’ida,” from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
also provides an outline of the al Qaeda network.156 These articles were used in this 
study to identify the history, goals, and objectives of the al Qaeda organization and the 
role of the principals of “Shariah, or Islamic law” as a basis of the ideology of al 
Qaeda.157 
Likewise, the article “Al-Qaida: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, United States 
Department of State, April 2003,” available from the Terrorist Group Profiles of the 
Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School, was useful in identifying the pattern of 
155 John Pike, “al-Qa'ida (The Base),” [on-line resource] (Washington, D.C.: 
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rhetoric initiated by al Qaeda.158 This article focuses on and was used in the present 
study to illustrate the history, goals, and objectives of al Qaeda.159 Additionally, this 
database provides relevant information and statistics on terrorist groups and terrorist acts, 
including the September 11 attacks.160 
In a like manner, Jane Corbin outlines the origins of al Qaeda and points out that 
the Afghanistan War has not significantly decreased the threat of al Qaeda sponsored 
terrorism.161 Corbin provides a very limited analysis of the causes of al Qaeda sponsored 
terrorism, ignoring the historical realities of Western colonialism and the state-of-war 
conditions prevalent in international relations. Rohan Gunaranta, on the other hand, 
provides a more balanced analysis of the causes of terrorist acts perpetuated by al 
Qaeda. In addition, Gunaranta illustrates a well-documented outline of the origins of 
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al Qaeda and its goals and objectives.163 Similarly, the book Through Our Enemies ’ Eyes 
outlines the goals and objectives of al Qaeda.164 Correspondingly, in Al Qaeda: 
Brotherhood of Terror, Paul Williams also identifies the goals and objectives of al 
Qaeda.165 
One of the major elements contributing to the success of al Qaeda's facilitation of 
its goals and objectives is the nature of its financial network as Cindy Combs, in 
Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, identifies.166 Additionally, Adam Cohen, in 
"How bin Laden Funds His Network," points out the role of "Hawala" in the facilitation 
of the financing of al Qaeda’s goals.167 Furthermore, in the journal article "Usama bin 
Laden: the Nature of the Challenge,” Michael Collins Dunn provides an outline of the 
role of Osama (or Usama) bin Laden’s leadership in facilitating the financing of al 
Qaeda’s stated goals and objectives. Dunn also outlines the history of the al Qaeda 
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network and explains how bin Laden came to create the organization.169 In addition, 
Dunn points out attempts by the Clinton Administration to assassinate bin Laden during 
the American military strikes on August 20, 1998, in the Khowst and North Khartoum 
regions of Afghanistan.170 By making attempts on bin Laden's life, the 
U. S. may have conceivably exacerbated the conflict and provided al Qaeda further 
motivation to carry out terrorist acts against America, its interests, allies, and client states. 
Manifestations of al Qaeda’s Terrorist Attacks 
Did al Qaeda, in its attempt to carryout political violence inside the borders of the 
U.S., initiate other manifestations that the organization did not anticipate? Themes 
within some of the relevant literature reflect some important political manifestations that 
emerged out of the attacks. Some of these manifestations are represented in the foreign 
policy initiatives taken by the G. W. Bush Administration after the attacks. What have 
been the results of these initiatives? For one, a significant amount of world opinion 
outside the U.S. is that many of these initiatives have increased the state-of-war 
conditions in the international political arena.171 For example, the article “Poll: Israel and 
U.S.: Major Threats to World Peace” cites foreign public opinion polls that identify 
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America and Israel as posing the most severe threats to world peace.172 Historically, one 
of the major issues facing the U.S. in terms of its relations with Arab Muslims has been 
its support for Israel.173 In the article "Palestinians Mark Anniversary with a Promise to 
Fight" Atef Sa’ad gives one example of this by illustrating the point that the U.S. has 
largely financed the Israeli occupation of Palestine.174 Correspondingly, in “A 
Conservative Total for U.S. Aid to Israel: $91 Billion—and Counting” Shirl McArthur 
states that U.S. aid to Israel has been excessive compared to aid given to Arab states.175 
Additionally, the book Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice provides an 
historical, descriptive analysis of U.S. involvement in the state-of-war conditions 
comprising the Israeli and Palestinian conflict.176 Such realities serve the rhetorical aims 
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of al Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalists by allowing them to point to the 
Palestinian situation as an example, in their opinion, of U.S. determination to repress 
Arab Muslims. 
Since September 11, 2001, the G. W. Bush Administration has continued to 
facilitate policy initiatives that would have been next to impossible without the fear 
created by the attacks. Specifically, Jamie York argues that the September 11 attacks 
provided the impetus for the Bush Administration to carry out two preemptive wars (in 
Afghanistan and Iraq) and establish a military presence in the oil-rich Middle Eastern 
region.177 Additionally, York posits that a significant amount of these policies was 
effectively in the interest of the oil industry.178 This article is used to argue that the Bush 
Administration characterizes the “terrorists” as “evil doers” in an attempt to use such 
rhetoric to push its hegemonic foreign policy agenda.179 
Jim Lobe points out that even though the September 11 attacks provided the 
impetus for the Bush Administration to facilitate certain foreign policy initiatives, many 
of these initiatives were in the planning stages as far back as the early 1990s. For 
example, the neo-conservative think tank, Project for a New American Century (PNAC), 
which involved several high-ranking members of the G. W. Bush Administration, called 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Jim Lobe, “Bush's Foreign Policy Blueprint: A Grand Global Plan,” [on-line 
journal] (Washington D.C.: Tom Paine Common Sense: A Public Interest Journal, 26 
March 2002, accessed 7 July 2003); available from 
http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/5345; Internet. 
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for many of the foreign policy initiatives taken by this Administration after the 
September 11 attacks as far back as 1998.181 
According to the G. W. Bush Administration, the foreign policy initiatives taken 
after the September 11 attacks were necessary, due to the subsequent state-of-war 
conditions that prevailed. These conditions led the Bush Administration to initiate 
policies that were similar to the domestic national security policies initiated by the 
Roosevelt Administration during World War II.182 The court case of Hirabayashi v. 
United States provided the basis for executive orders issued by the Roosevelt 
Administration in 1943.183 This case designated military sectors and established the War 
Relocation Department that was responsible for detaining individuals who could 
potentially be a threat to national security.184 The executive orders and legislative 
policies that were based on this case provided justification for the Bush Administration to 
facilitate similar policies after the September 11 attacks.185 According to Timothy Lynch, 
181 Project for a New American Century, “Letter to Bill Clinton,” [on-line 
resource] (Washington, D.C.: Project for a New American Century, 26 January 1998, 
accessed 3 October 2003; and “Letter to George W. Bush,” 21 Sept 2001, accessed 3 
October 2003); available from http://newamericancentury.org/Clintonletter.htm; Internet. 
182 Hirahyshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 no. 870, [on-line database] (U.S. 




185 Timothy Lynch, “Patriotic Questions: Addressing the Patriot Act,” [on-line 
periodical] (National Review, 21 August 2003, accessed 30 November 2002); available 
from http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-lynch082103 .asp; Internet. 
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individuals designated as detainees by the G. W. Bush Administration may be transferred 
out of the country at any time, are not allowed to file a writ of habeas corpus, and may be 
prosecuted in a military tribunal.186 This reference is used in the present study to identify 
the breath of powers extended to the executive branch of the U.S. government after 
September 11, 2001. 
Summarizing Statements 
In summary, this review reflects the nature of the relevant literature in terms of 
addressing the major concerns of this study. Specifically, the breadth of the literature (as 
relevant this study) encompasses works related to international relations in terms of the 
role of the state in causing and/or limiting global political violence, the realist concept of 
anarchy in the international state of nature, and Hobbes’s theory of the state of nature and 
the social contract as it relates to the egoistic tendency of humans toward violent conflict. 
Additionally, this chapter provides a summary of some of the relevant literature regarding 
the nature of political violence and the special character of terrorism as political violence. 
Lastly, this review reflects a brief summary of the literature regarding al Qaeda, its goals, 
objectives, and role in the facilitation of terrorist acts such as the September 11 attacks. 
186 Ibid. 
CHAPTER 3 
HOBBES’S CONCEPT OF THE EGOISTIC STATE OF NATURE AS A 
CAUSE OF VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT 
This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of Hobbes’s political philosophy as it 
is outlined in Leviathan for the purpose of investigating what motivates individuals to 
engage in political violence and conflict. Secondly, the chapter examines Hobbes’s 
conception of the egoistic nature of individuals, the state of nature, and the social contract 
as areas of concern. These areas are delineated in order to provide in the following 
chapter the foundation for the development of an inference regarding the relationship 
between the above-stated aspects of Hobbes’s political philosophy and the causes of the 
September 11 attacks. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a critical analysis of 
Hobbesian political philosophy, exploring the many logical and practical aspects of his 
theory, or to point out the rational inconsistencies in its structure. It also does not seek to 
discuss specifically the September 11 attacks or al Qaeda, but, rather, it seeks to provide 
an overview of the relevant Hobbesian concepts that will be used in Chapter 4 in 
exploring the stated central research problem of this study. 
Social scientists have utilized Hobbes’s approach to the study of violence and 
conflict because his model provides an answer to the following question: What is the 
relationship of the egoistic tendencies (the pursuit of self-interest, obsession with self- 
preservation, glorification, and an endless desire to be the master over other individuals’ 
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lives and properties) prevalent in human nature to the causes of the hostilities present in 
international relations which, themselves, can be described as reflections of a state of 
nature? Ultimately, the Hobbesian theory of the state of nature, characterized by an 
absence of civil authority, may serve as a way to allow powerful individuals or actors to 
dominate others and dictate that others yield to their specific self-interests. In order to 
facilitate a clear understanding of these concerns, it is best that we begin such a critique 
by exploring the egoistic component of Hobbes’s state of nature. 
Hobbes’s Theory of Egoism 
Hobbes’s conception of egoism is based on the application of relativism to human 
nature.1 More specifically, his ethical theory regarding morality, right and wrong, and 
good and bad is based on an egoistically based moral relativism. It is important to note 
this element of Hobbes’s philosophy in reference to the concerns of this study as well as 
the following ethical question: When is it “wrong” to use acts of political violence in the 
pursuit of self-interests? Implicit in Hobbes’s theory is the fact that a subjective question 
such as this is open to interpretation and, therefore, is morally relative. From this 
beginning position, “Hobbes had both stated and explained moral relativism: there were 
no objective moral properties, but what seemed good was what pleased any individual or 
was good for him.”3 Thus, there is no absolute truth as to what is good or bad or right or 





wrong. These determinations are simply the judgments of the observer. It is the relativist 
nature of what individuals deem as good and pleasurable (as well as the relative means of 
achieving these good and pleasurable ends, facilitated in actions), which leads to 
conflict.4 
Within the above stated conception of moral relativism, as applied to the 
facilitation of political violence, the following question arises: When are acts of political 
violence against non-combatant civilian targets morally permissible? For example, was it 
morally permissible (i.e., good) for the Allied Forces during World War II to knowingly 
bomb and kill German civilian noncombatants in order to destroy a murderous and 
hostile regime that destabilized Europe and was perceived by many as “bad?” In this 
instance, were the bombings “good” because they destroyed a perceived “bad” regime? 
Likewise, if the al Qaeda network perceives U.S. foreign policy as “bad,” are they then 
morally “right” to attack and kill American citizens/noncombatants in political violence 
facilitated as terrorist attacks? Certainly, most American citizens would answer no to this 
question. However, many Germans who were bombed during the Allied air raids of 
World War II would conceivably say that the Allies were not morally “right” to kill 
civilians/noncombatants and that these were “bad” or immoral actions. This example 
illustrates the relative nature of morality when it is applied to acts of political violence. 
The relative nature of moral concerns as a basis for determining good 
consequences is perceived as being equivalent to the pursuit of self-interest in Hobbesian 
4Ibid. 
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theory.5 More specifically, Hobbes would argue that moral perceptions are simply 
reflections of self-interest.6 Ultimately, at a minimum, individuals perceive that what is 
“good” is in their best self-interest.7 8 In the examples above of the étions of the Allied 
forces in World War II and of al Qaeda in the present, each designation of what is “good” 
and “bad” is based on perceived self-interest. The Allies, in an attempt to destroy the 
Third Reich, saw the necessity of bombing civilian targets, as it was in their own 
collective interests to do so. Conversely, German civilians who were being injured and 
killed perceived these actions as “bad” because they were in opposition to their collective 
interests. Certainly, no sane collective group of individuals would consider being bombed 
continuously in the type of massive air campaign that was facilitated by the Allies as 
being in their best self-interests. 
The desires to acquire what is good (as represented in self-interested behavior and 
o 
the motivation toward self-preservation) are characterized by Hobbes as passions. If 
individuals cannot preserve themselves, then all other self-interested goals are 
meaningless. Correspondingly, Hobbes’s perspective implies that humans naturally 






most basic self-interested passion. 9 Therefore, individuals have strong passions for what 
they deem good and in their own self-interest. Thus, the natural instinct toward self- 
interest is pervasive in self-preservation. Ultimately, self-interest is seen as good. 
Individuals naturally desire to take actions that will lead to good results. Because 
individuals naturally desire good consequences, they will consistently strive to take 
actions that they perceive will lead to these consequences. Resultantly, specific actions 
are perceived by individuals as being in their own self-interests and, therefore, as 
contributing to their preservation.10 Therefore, passions will lead individuals toward 
behaviors that will best serve their interests.11 The blatant pursuit of self-interest is a 
passion and, as such, is a survival technique used in conditions wherein everyone pursues 
his/her own narrow, or individually defined, best interest as he/she sees fit. According to 
Hobbes’s perspective, “everyone acts solely for himself, dominated by the passion for 
i 
self-preservation.” 




12T. E. Jessop, Thomas Hobbes (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1960), 
18-19. 
13Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 
1899), 201. 
68 
“tendency to self-preservation is a characteristic of all beings.”14 Therefore, it is 
meaningless to condemn individuals for pursuing their own self-preservation or even 
what they perceive as good.15 Echoing this view, Hobbes writes the following: 
Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my 
words? But neither of us accuses man’s nature in it. The Desires, and 
other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions 
that proceed from those Passions,.. .16 
In the above quote, Hobbes suggests that it is natural for individuals to pursue 
what is in their perceived self-interests. The role of natural desires and motivations is a 
constant theme in Hobbesian philosophy.17 Hobbes describes the natural tendencies, 
• 18 
emotions, desires, and motivations of individuals as aspects of the human appetite. 
Human appetite represents the animal nature of individuals. Humans, as opposed to 
animals, however, can rationalize and devise strategies designed to serve their interests.19 
Thus, human appetite is fueled by reason and rationally applied to the infinite, self- 
14Ibid. 
15Thomas Van Hobbes, Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Forme & Power of a 
Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. Alfred Rayney Waller (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1904), 63. 
16 Ibid. 
nLeo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis, 




interested motivations of individuals and their perceptions of what is good. Human 
appetite is also a dominant motivation for the acquisition of power. Hobbes states the 
following regarding power: 
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a 
perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in 
Death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more 
intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be 
content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power 
and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of 
more.21 
Toward that end, Strauss points out that “the clearest and most perfect expression 
for the naturalistic conception of human appetite is the proposition that man desires 
power and ever greater power, spontaneously and continuously.”22 This desire for power 
may be irrational (consisting of purely animal appetite) or “rational” (consisting of 
logical cerebration). Furthermore, an individual’s pursuit of power represents an 
obsession, one that can only be contained through the predominance of superior power.24 
According to Strauss, the rational striving for the acquisition and maintenance of power is 
perceived as being in an individual’s self-interest.25 Individuals seek power because it is 
20Ibid„ 10-11. 
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natural, and because they perceive power as good. By definition, if it is good, then it is in 
an individual’s best self-interest. 
Beyond this motivation for power, individuals seek to provide for their own 
preservation by instilling fear in o3ther individuals and demanding obedience from other 
individuals as a means to an end of self-preservation and the pursuit of self-interests. 
However, Hobbes tells us that some individuals pursue power beyond the point needed 
for their individual survival: 
[Additionally,] ... because there be some, that taking pleasure in 
contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue 
farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad 
to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their 
power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their 
defense, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion 
over men, being necessary to a man’s conservation; it ought to be allowed 
him.27 
Humans, by nature, are power hungry. Hobbes conceptualizes that the pursuit of 
power is intrinsically tied to self-interest and self-preservation. However, it is these 
egoist tendencies that lead to the conditions prevalent in the state of nature. 
Hobbes’s Egoistic State of Nature 
It is the above-stated egoistically based moral relativism that Hobbes uses to infer a 
resulting set of varying circumstances that would lead to a state of nature where humans 
live in their ‘natural conditions.’28 This is further conceptualized by Hobbes as the 
26Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (Oxford: 
Oxford University, 1999), 550. 
97 
Hobbes, Leviathan, 83. 
28Jessop, 18-19. 
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absence of civil authority represented by the lack of sufficient political organization. It 
is this lack of sufficient political organization combined with the natural egoistic 
condition of individuals that leads to the conditions that result in the state of nature. 
According to Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war.31 As a result, self-interest may 
be sought at the expense of any other individuals and/or their interests. As proof of this 
conceptualization, Hobbes points out the following: 
Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms 
himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks 
his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he 
knowes there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all 
injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, 
when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and 
of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there 
as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? 
In Hobbes’s view, by observing constants in human behavior that exist in 
societies with civil authority and simultaneously applying those observable constants of 
human behavior to potential conditions absent of civil authority, it is possible to reach his 
conclusions regarding the egoistic state of nature. By qualifying these observable facts in 
specific terms, reasoning will lead to the realization that people are inherently egoistic 
and obsessed with self-preservation even in conditions consisting of established political 
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absent of civil authority, the circumstances would definitively be like that found in a state 
of nature. Hobbes posits that to locate evidence that people are naturally this way; 
individuals should simply look within themselves and determine their own nature through 
a self-evaluation.33 Through their own rational self-evaluations individuals infer an 
understanding of the true nature of people in general. Specifically, Hobbes points out 
“that wisdom is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men.”34 In other words, it is 
imperative in the attempt to understand human nature that individuals exercise the 
doctrine “Nosce teipsum” (read thy self). Individuals have self-contained experimental 
models within themselves, and individuals should rationalize inductively from the 
specific to the general in order to determine human nature. By looking at their own 
individual passions and desires, people can reason to conclusions regarding human nature 
in general. Hobbes’s position is that all individuals have the same natural egoistic 
emotions and motivations. 
Based on these conceptualizations, Hobbes discerns what rights individuals would 
have in this state of nature. In the state of nature behavior is unrestrained and individuals 
are within their rights to do anything they deem necessary in the pursuit of their self- 
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interest and the desire for power, are natural tendencies. As natural tendencies they are 
conceptualized as “rights.”37 In conditions characteristic of the state of nature, it is 
meaningless to speak of a natural human instinct that is not a “right.” Hobbes argues that 
what people perceive as “good” is in their self-interest, and is essential to self- 
preservation. The actions taken by individuals in the pursuit of these goals are natural 
rights that all people have in the absence of civil authority. Because it is natural (i.e., 
instinctive for people) to pursue their own self-preservation, it is their natural right to do 
so. Hobbes points out that “it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to 
o  t t 
every thing; even to one anothers body.” As stated earlier, Hobbes posits that this 
natural pursuit of self-interest and self-preservation is partly undertaken through the use 
of reason and is partly rational in nature.39 This natural right grows out of the natural 
innate instinct of appetite and the “rational striving for power.”40 
The striving for power also has another dimension. If one individual has the 
ability to gain dominion over others through the acquisition and maintenance of power, 
then that individual has the right to do so within a state of nature.41 Hobbes states, “The 







hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that 
is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own 
judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”42 
Beyond the desire for power and the playing out of natural egoistic tendencies in 
the state of nature, Hobbes identifies three causes of “quarrel” (“competition,” 
“diffidence” and “glory”) that are essential parts of the state of nature.43 The following 
illustrates the bases for these three causes of quarrel: 
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the 
third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters 
of other mens[s/c] persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to 
defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, 
and any other signe [s/c] of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by 
reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or 
their Name.44 
The first cause of quarrel, competition, is centered in the natural appetite of man, 
consisting of the continual pursuit of power45 and a struggle for limited resources 46 







Darwinian evolutionary theory of natural selection47 and of the population 
theory of Malthus. In evolutionary theory species are in competition with one another 
for limited resources. A brief, simplistic version of this theory follows below: 
1. “Organisms produce far more offspring than required to maintain their 
population sizes, and yet their population sizes generally remain more or less 
constant over long periods of time. From this fact, as well as from 
observation, it seems clear that there is a high rate of mortality among 
immature individuals. 
2. Individuals in any population show much variation, and those that 
survive do so to a large extent because of their particular 
characteristics. That is, individuals with certain characteristics can be 
considered better adapted to their particular environments. 
3. Since offspring resemble their parents closely, though not exactly, successive 
generations will maintain and improve on the degree of adaptation by gradual 
changes in each generation.”49 
Extended into the political, social and economic realms, these ideas have been coined 
Social Darwinism or social imperialism and they flow from the conceptualizations of 
Kidd, Spencer, and Pearson.^0 The theories of Adam Smith also reflect and focus on the 
47Bernard Campbell, Human Ecology: The Story of Our Place in Nature from 
Prehistory to the Present (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995), 5. 
48 
T. R. Malthus, Parallel Chapters from the First and Second Editions of An 
Essay on the Principle of Population (New York: Macmillan, 1895), 9. 
49Campbell, 5. 
50Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial 
Thought, 1895-1914, ed. Ruth and David Glass (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1960), 
29-32. 
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element of competition.51 The conceptions of Adam Smith and Social Darwinism both 
emphasize the natural order of life and the role of competition as main variables in the 
causes of quarrel and conflict. Darwin is credited with being one of the founders of 
“scientific naturalism,” and Hobbes is credited with being the father of “ethical 
naturalism.”52 Hobbes is credited as such because his view of the pursuit of self- 
preservation corresponds to the ideas contained in ethical naturalism.53 In terms of 
Malthusian theory, “population, when unchecked, increased in a geometrical ratio; and 
subsistence for man in an arithmetical ratio.”54 Malthus goes on, perhaps unwittingly, to 
support Hobbes’s basic premise: 
All cannot share alike the bounties of nature. Were there [is] no 
established administration of property, every man would be obliged to 
guard with force his little store. Selfishness would be triumphant. The 
subjects of contention would be perpetual. Every individual mind would 
be under a constant anxiety about corporal support; [sz'c] and not a single 
intellect would be left free to expatiate in the field of thought.55 
The second cause of quarrel identified by Hobbes is diffidence. Diffidence is 
defined by Hobbes as fear and mistrust that others desire what one has, including 
51 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
ed. C. J. Bullock (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1909), 39. 
52Reginald A. P. Rogers, A Short History of Ethics, Greek and Modern (London: 





possibly one’s life and is based on the conceptualization that individuals are relatively 
equal in their abilities to compete against each other.56 In the state of nature humans are 
naturally and relatively equal, both mentally and physically, insofar as even the weakest 
person has the strength to kill the strongest.57 One individual may be stronger than 
another, but the weaker individual may be smarter and therefore able to defeat the 
stronger individual through superior intelligence, conspiracy with others, deceit, trickery, 
or prudence.58 Hobbes’s philosophy, therefore, defines equality as an individual’s natural 
and relative ability to pursue their self-interest verses another individual’s relative ability 
to do the same. This equality is what breeds diffidence.59 According to Hobbes, based 
on this condition of “diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure 
himself.”60 The empirical realization and recognition by individuals that all other 
individuals have the same fear, mistrust and timidity as themselves, leads to escalating 
conflict in the state of nature. Consequently, if individual “A” looks within herself, then 
she will see a naturally diffident, fearful entity prepared to do anything to preserve her 
preservation and ensure the realization of her perceived self-interest. Therefore, through 
inductive reasoning, individual “A” automatically assumes that everyone else has the 
56Hobbes, Leviathan, 82. 
57Russell, 550. 
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same fears as she has. Based on this reasoning, individual “A” has a mistrust of all other 
individuals, and based on the same rationale, all other individuals have a mistrust of 
individual “A.” Ultimately, everyone has a mistrust of everyone else, and this mistrust is 
based on fear and recognition that everyone has the same reservations towards one 
another. 
This equality of ability is such that individuals have the perception that they 
naturally have the capabilities to pursue their interests in the same manner as other 
individuals.61 Hobbes explains this concept in the following way: 
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the 
attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, 
which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in 
the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and 
sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one 
another. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no 
more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or 
possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come 
prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of 
the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader 
again is in the like danger of another.62 
Ultimately, the realities of equality and diffidence would reasonably lead rational 
actors in a state of nature to reason in the following manner: What is the most secure plan 
of action to protect my interests considering the obivious conditions? If individuals in the 
state of nature place this question within a rational framework, then they may, in some 
instances, come up with the idea of preemption or prevention. 63 Preemption is the 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63Robert R. Leonhard and James R. McDonough, Fighting by Minutes: Time and 
the Art of War (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 154-156. 
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process of undertaking a “first strike attack”64 against a perceived threat. The right to do 
anything that an individual deems rational and necessary to preserve one’s life and limb 
includes the perceived inherent right to carry out preemptive strikes against other 
individuals or groups who may be perceived as a threat, even if that individual or group 
is, in reality, not a threat. Since other individuals are perceived and assumed to be a 
threat, an individual carries out preemptive strikes against others to conceivably get rid of 
or reduce that perceived threat. A first strike preemptive scenario may be perceived by 
the first individual as essential to the protection of life and property. This scenario can be 
rationalized in the following way: 
1. It is my (the first individual’s) natural right to protect my life, property, and pursuit 
of my pleasure by any means that I see fit. 
2. Based on my inductive rationalization of the true nature of people and the 
subsequent state of nature that exists in a society with no civil authority, I am in 
perpetual fear of being attacked by others, and it is within my rights to rationally 
decide to attack them before they attack me. 
3. Under these conditions, why should I ever endeavor toward peace at all or 
cease my preemptive or preventive attacks when others are perpetually 
rationalizing the state-of-nature conditions in the same manner as I am? 
4. If I decide to endeavor toward peace to the degree that I expect others to, 
then others may in effect carry out preemptive attacks on me since it is well 
within their rights to do so. 
5. Until there is an ultimate power that can protect me from these threats and 
guarantee the protection of my life and interests, I will continue these 
preemptive strikes. 
64Stephen J. Cimbala, First Strike Stability: Deterrence after Containment (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 29. 
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Consequently, preemption leads to more fear and diffidence and this diffidence 
“broadens into a general cupidi, in some crowned with a passion for prestige.”65 This 
passion for prestige, or glorification, simply heightens the state-of-war conditions in the 
state of nature. Hobbes defines glorification as “joy, arising from the imagination of 
[one’s] . . . own power and ability.”66 The motivation toward glorification is also viewed 
as contributing to the acquisition and maintenance of the reputation of an individual.67 In 
Hobbes’s view, “a good reputation (is). . . commendable.” 68 
Implicit in this argument regarding the acquisition of glory, as it relates to the 
maintenance of reputations, is an explanation of the circumstances that lead to individuals 
practicing cruelty toward one another.69 According to Hobbes, individuals in a state of 
nature view their respective self-interests as being directly related to how much cruelty 
could be dealt out to other individuals.70 An individual’s powerful reputation may be 
enhanced by developing a reputation for practicing cruelty toward others, which, in 
essence, sends the message “don’t threaten or attack me.” Consequently, this could 
65Jessop, 18-19. 






potentially have a self-preservation benefit for individuals in the state of nature. Hobbes 
explains that “contempt or little sense of the calamity of others is that which men call 
cruelty.” This represents a twisted zero-sum gain scenario where one individual’s well¬ 
being is seen as being affected by another’s ability to deal out cruelty.72 Additionally, the 
bad fortune of some is perceived as a gain for the self-interest of others. 
For example, if individual “A’s” actions directly or indirectly cause or contribute to 
individual “B’s” losses, then individual “A” may see this as a gain. Conversely, if 
individual “B” gains something, then individual “A” may view “B’s” gain as a loss, even 
if what “B” gained was something that could not, in any tangible way, lead to a gain or a 
loss for “A.” 
Ending the Egoistic State of Nature through the Hobbesian Social Contract 
In Hobbes’s view the realities that would exist in the state of nature are 
undeniable truths, and he believes that without any restraint to prevent the egoistic natural 
instincts of individuals, a state of constant war would exist.73 This constant state of war 
would be an “enemy to every man” because all individual interests would be in constant 
jeopardy.74 As noted, the pursuit of pleasure, self-interest, power, preservation, and 
relative equality in the hope of attaining these ends leads to the three principal causes of 
71Ibid. 
72Barbara Ameil, John Locke and America: The Defense of English Colonialism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 145. 
73Hobbes, Leviathan, 84. 
74Ibid. 
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quarrels—competition, diffidence, and the pursuit of glory. These causes or motivations 
are freely, openly, and rightly pursued by all. It is completely within the rights of all 
individuals to do so because it is in their nature to pursue their interests. Furthermore, in 
a state of nature ownership of private property would be tenuous, at best. No one could 
have complete ownership of anything because everything would be fair game. This 
condition allows for no person to be secure and thus threatens human existence, as there 
will always be death attempts made on people’s lives if for no other reason than seeking 
to acquire their material possessions. Hobbes summarizes his view of what human 
existence would be like in a state of nature: 
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live in awe [without 
sovereign power], they are in that condition which is called Warre; and 
such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARJŒ, 
consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, 
wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore 
the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in 
the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a 
showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: 
So the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known 
disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the 
contrary. All other time is PEACE. 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man 
is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live 
without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall 
furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the 
fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no 
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no 
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as 
require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; 
no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and 




These realities lead individuals, as rational beings not acting solely on their 
animal instincts, to realize that there exists a reality that can be discovered through 
rational thought. Specifically, Hobbes points out that “consequently it is a precept, or 
general rule of reason, that everyman, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of 
obtaining it.” This represents the “first, Fundamental Law of Nature; which is, to seek 
peace, and follow it.”77 The natural right to blatantly express one’s egoistic tendencies, 
to pursue one’s self-interests unabated, and the right to obtain anything that another 
person has (i.e., the right to everything), is balanced by means of the fundamental law of 
nature. This fundamental law requires that even though the right to everything may exist, 
people should seek peace to the extent that they expect others to seek peace. In this 
instance a balance is achieved through a distinction between a “law” and a “right”. In 
essence, “the former contained restraints necessary to make life secure (and) ... the latter 
implied liberty.”79 
Hobbes’s attempts to use the distinction between rights and laws (i.e., liberties) to 
explain the seemly inherent contradiction between the natural right of individuals to do 
anything they deem necessary and the first, Fundamental Law of Nature, which argues 
that everyone should endeavor toward peace. One element in this inherent contradiction 
76Ibid., 87. 
77Ibid. 
78 Cornelius F. Murphy, “The Grotian Vision of World Order,” American Journal 
of International Law 76 (1982): 484. 
79Ibid. 
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refers to a point made earlier in this chapter: Why should any individual endeavor 
toward peace when he or she inductively realizes, (based on egoistic moralism, diffidence 
and equality) that every other individual is a potential threat? Hobbes initially addresses 
this problem by balancing liberty and freedom designated as a “right” with the restraint 
implied in a “law.” Hobbes’s rationale is as follows: While it is true that individuals 
naturally posses the “right” to do anything they deem necessary, it is also true that an 
undeniable law (the first, Fundamental Law of Nature) requires individuals to seek peace 
if they wish to have “hope of attaining it.” The operative phase here is “hope of attaining 
it,” because if individual “A” is interested in her own preservation and self-interest, then 
rationally she will determine that the best way to achieve this is through a compact with 
other individuals and/or groups that amounts to an enforceable contract. 
An enforceable contract—the social contract—becomes an agreement or covenant 
between rational individuals who concede that relative peace is in everyone’s self-interest 
as opposed to a constant state of war.80 This contract represents the rational pursuit of 
self-interest through a collective social transaction and is based on the idea of mutual 
advantage.81 Mutual advantage “is what one would call a causal generalization of self- 
interest.” Mutual advantage, determined through reason, provides the basis for 
cooperation among self-interested individuals. In other words, it is reason that motivates 





individuals to engage in the collective pursuit of mutual advantage. Therefore, the 
basic rationale of mutual advantage leads to all types of cooperative possibilities among 
individuals, inclusive of the social contract. Hobbes writes the following regarding the 
concept of the social contract: 
The mutual transferring of right is that which men call contract. 
Signs of contract are either expressed or by inference. Expressed are 
words spoken with understanding of what they signify: and such words 
are either of the time present or past... or of the future. Signs of 
inference are sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes ... of 
silence; sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action... .84 
For Hobbes the social contract is a mutual agreement among individuals 
expressed directly in words or through inference. One example of contracting through 
inference would be agreeing to the terms of the contract, not through words or signature, 
but by compliance to it. In Hobbes’s view, this basic idea leads to the natural evolution 
of the social contract from individual “rights” in the state of nature to individual “duties” 
in civil society. ' R. E. Ewin provides an explanation of this evolution: 
The [social] contract... for societies, then, will be a model called 
for at the end of Hobbes’ argument, in effect summarizing his conclusion; 
[s/c] it cannot be the logical starting point of his argument. He will have 
to show by independent argument that human social life necessarily 
involves the rights and duties that might lead us to say that even if no 
actual contract produced this particular society, it could have been a 
contract that produced it; that is, that the contract is a way of producing 
oz 
this sort of relationship. 
83David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
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A social contract is “a basis for legitimate legal and political power in the idea of 
a contract and further contracts are things that create obligations.”87 The concept of the 
social contract is a stalwart in political philosophy and provides the basis for the 
existence of civil society.88 As Gauthier states, “An impressive array of political 
philosophers have championed the idea that a social contract, understood as a rational 
agreement among rational persons, can supply the normative blueprint for an ideally 
well-ordered society.” But, what are the conditions necessary for such a contract to be 
applicable and also create obligations and duties? Toward that end, Sacks feels that 
“Hobbes speaks of people giving up their rights as a consequence of their own self- 
preservation where a person sees his own preservation resulting from him giving up his 
right to all things.”90 At the most basic level people are persuaded to do this as a result of 
“the fear of violence and death.”91 
The fear of violence and death, or the desire for self-preservation is the essential 
motivation for rational, self-interested individuals to seek a covenant that will also create 
87Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 354. 
88Michael Milde, “Unreasonable Foundations: David Gauthier on Property 
Rights, Rationality, and the Social Contract,” Social Theory and Practice 25 (1999): 1. 
89Ibid. 




obligations and duties. According to Hobbes, rational individuals would eventually 
realize that “liberty and equality are found to be valuable only when they were 
accompanied by security; [s/c] and security could be obtained only by . . . (a) surrender of 
(rights).”92 This is the essential element in the Hobbesian social contract. Individuals 
must agree to give up their right to anything for the relative peace and security of some 
things. This partial surrender of rights is done purely out of self-interest. This reasoning 
follows the logic of a cost-benefit analysis wherein the cost of giving up some liberties 
and rights are exceeded by the relative benefit gained in the probability of conserving 
one's life, limb, and property. Therefore, self-interest, in the form of cooperation, may 
take precedence over power acquisition and preemption if individuals can rationally 
conceive of a relative, direct advantage. Even in a state of nature people will cooperate 
and share power if it is in their perceived best-interests.93 More specifically, rational 
individuals will sacrifice a portion of their rights if they reason that they will profit more 
then they forfeit.94 This represents a calculation of rational self-interest that is based on 
the realization that individuals are “political animals(s).”95 Therefore, a requirement for a 
successful social contract is that any agreement or covenant adopted must rationally show 
some appreciable, relative, political advantage over the state of nature in order to 
92T. V. Smith, The American Philosophy of Equality (Chicago: The University of 





encourage individuals to give up some rights. Moreover, “it is incumbent on this type of 
social contract to answer the following question: What theory of morals can ever serve 
any useful purpose, unless it can show that all the duties it recommends are also in the 
true interest of each individual?”96 
As noted, in a state of nature everyone would have the natural right to everything, 
including the right to take another person’s life. However, when a person lays down her 
natural right for her own self-preservation and self-interest, it is based on the belief that 
others will do the same.97 Hobbes states, “That a man be willing, when others are so too, 
as far-forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary to lay down 
this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he 
would allow other men against himself.”98 Ultimately, for the Hobbesian social contract 
to work everyone, or at least a majority of individuals, must agree to give up certain 
rights. 
Another motivation for individuals to give up rights and agree to the social 
contract is the desire to acquire and secure private property and material possessions.99 
In a state of nature, ownership and maintenance of private property would be tenuous, at 
96Gauthier, 113. 
97Hobbes, Leviathan, 87. 
98Ibid. 
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best, and impossible at worst. The concept of the protection of material possessions and 
private property is imperative in contractual theory.100 
The protection of private property is a stalwart in many societies that is based on 
contractual theory.101 For instance, in the United States, the acquisition and protection of 
private property is essential to the role of political authority. Moreover, the protection 
of private property through the legitimizing of political authority via the social contract 
tended to “appeal to the American historical needs because the enslaved Africans were 
considered private property.”103 
Leviathan: The Third Party in the Social Contract 
The preceding pages of this chapter focus on the egoistic nature of individuals, 
equality, diffidence, and the role of the absence of sovereign political authority in what 
conceivably would be a Hobbesian state of nature. The point has been made that it is the 
rational pursuit of self-interest and preservation of self that leads individuals to discover 
that the social contract provides the most logical mechanism to end the state of nature. 
This agreement is made among individuals and consists of the giving up of certain rights 
if other individuals agree to do the same. However, the Hobbesian social contract entails 






party.104 This third party agrees to protect the rights that individuals have vacated.105 
This second element of the contract is between a collective group of individuals and a 
sovereign political authority.106 The sovereign represents the third party in the social 
contract and political/civil authority is considered by Hobbes to be established at the 
point that rights are transferred.107 Hobbes refers to the sovereign as the Leviathan, the 
common wealth, or the Civitas.108 The political authority of the Leviathan is exercised 
through the state apparatus as it exists in its various manifestations. Hobbes specifically 
defines the scenario of the transferring of rights to a third party as well the role of the 
state and its relationship to the sovereign in the following way: 
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to 
defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one 
another, and thereby to secure them ... is, to conferre all their power and 
strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men. . . . This is more 
than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall... as if every man should say to 
every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to 
this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up 
thy Right to him, and Authorize all his Actions in like manner.109 
104Hobbes, Leviathan, 118-119. 
105Ibid. 
I06G. D. H. Cole, trans., introduction to The Social Contract and Discourses, by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (New York: Dutton, 1950), xxii. 
107Hobbes, Leviathan, 119. 
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The state represents the collective will of individuals transformed and transferred 
to the power of the sovereign.110 The above passage defines Hobbes’s conceptualization 
of the necessity of the state and the role of the sovereign in the political organization of 
society. In this scenario the sovereign is empowered through the apparatus of the state to 
maintain domestic peace and provide for security against foreign invasion. 
In Hobbes’s view, the creation of the state and sovereign power is synonymous to 
God's creation of individuals.111 Thus, Hobbes characterizes the state as an “artificial 
man.” Hobbes points out that “nature, (the Art whereby God hath made and governes 
the World), is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it 
can make an Artificial Animal”.113 Humans imitate God’s creation of the human animal 
through the artificial creation of the state. 
Hobbes also contends that there is a second intrinsic relationship between God, 
nature, man, and the State. God, in creating the natural world, created a process that 
allowed humans to evolve under certain natural conditions. Therefore, human nature, in 
its egoistic manifestations, could not have been any different than it is. Thus, if 
individuals evolved in a specific way based on the process of nature that God initiated 
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deduction, a causal product of God and nature? Hobbes states that, “The pacts and 
covenants, by which the parts of this body politic [the state] were at first made, set 
together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the 
Creation.”114 
Hobbes views the artificial animal, the state, as an entity akin to a large person or 
a mechanical system such as a watch, wherein each part of the state is comparable to the 
parts of the body or the mechanisms of the watch.115 This artificial animal consists of 
various interrelated parts that are connected to the center, or the heart, and are designed to 
work together toward a specific end.116 The various joints and nerves are connected to 
the principal part, which is the sovereign.117 The sovereign is the “heart” and, thus, the 
1 1 o 
most important part of the state. Moreover, the sovereign is the mechanism that 
provides “life and motion to the whole body.”119 The joints and nerves are represented in 
the administrative and bureaucratic structure of the state apparatus, which connects to the 
114Ibid., xviii-xix. 






sovereign center and works together to perform the functions of the state.120 The 
sovereign controls and centralizes the various working parts of the state in the same 
manner that the various springs and wheels operate the functions of a watch or that limbs 
operate the motions of the human body.121 
The sovereign is the element that allows the state to function.122 It is the 
123 sovereign that enforces the political order and establishes the moral basis of society. 
Additionally, “moral distinctions become valid only through the alchemy of the sovereign 
will.”124 In the following quote, Hobbes explains how the sovereign gains this power: 
The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two ways. One, by Naturall 
force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their 
children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or 
by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that 
condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to 
some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be 
protected by him against all others. This latter, may be called a Politicall 
Common-wealth, or Commonwealth by Institution; and the former, a 
• • • 19c 
Common-wealth by Acquisition. 
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In the above passage Hobbes categorizes the acquisition of power by the 
sovereign as being either forcibly acquired or acquired by consent. In the former case, 
power is taken either through natural force in the form of violence or through the threat of 
the use of violence.126 Concerning the latter, power is given through popular consent, 
where the majority agrees that an individual or group of individuals be given sovereign 
power. In this case state power is conferred to the sovereign through the consent of the 
masses. This consent ultimately provides the rationale for the existence of the state and 
simultaneously grants the sovereign legitimacy. The sovereign is empowered based on 
this granting of legitimacy, which itself is founded on the capitulation of the collective 
appetites of individuals to a higher power. Therefore, the legitimacy of sovereign power 
is based on popular consent.127 
The sovereign power, as embodied in the state upon the transference of individual 
rights, agrees to keep order and protect individuals and their property. It is imperative 
that the sovereign carries out these responsibilities for the maintenance of its legitimacy 
and political power.128 Toward that end, the following concerns are paramount: 
1. Rationally, why would individuals agree to give up certain rights to the 
sovereign if the sovereign is not obligated to protect certain aspects of those rights? 
196 • 
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2. One of the motivations for transferring rights to the sovereign power is to 
better protect one’s interests; consequently, individuals reasonably expect, when entering 
into the social contract, that the sovereign will be obligated to doing this. 
3. If the sovereign is not obligated to this and, in fact, does or cannot protect 
individual interests, then people may be motivated to overthrow that particular sovereign 
power and replace it with another sovereign power that is capable of protecting their 
interests. 
Beyond these concerns, is the possibility that the state of nature would return and 
the natural egoistic tendencies of individuals would once again become predominant. In 
fact, “the sovereign serves the individual's interest so long as he is sovereign in fact and 
actually wields the power necessary to hold the community together.” Ultimately, 
people only agree to give up their natural rights if the sovereign agrees to maintain order, 
defend their interests, and ensure their security beyond what would exist in a state of 
nature.130 Therefore, there is an implicit agreement between individuals and the 
sovereign. Specifically, social control is facilitated through this agreement between 
individuals and the sovereign and “this [agreement] will ground the nature of the 
obligations of each to the other.”131 The contract between the individual and the 
sovereign presents a social and political context where both are obligated to do certain 
things. The sovereign is obligated “to defend them [i.e., citizens] from the invasion of 
129 Murphy, 485. 
130Ibid. 
131 Blackburn, 354. 
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foreigners, and the injuries of one another”.132 Conversely, individuals are obligated to 
maintain the contract with other individuals and to abide by the decrees of the sovereign 
power.133 Hobbes states, “And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted 
[a]way his right; then he is said to be obliged or bound, not to hinder those [the sovereign 
power] to whom such right is granted.”134 Once the covenant is agreed upon and the 
transference of rights takes place, sovereign power is considered absolute. Sovereign 
power, as it is manifested under the obligations of the social contract, must not be 
challenged.136 Consequently, the sovereign has the right to infringe on the remaining 
rights and liberties of individuals, with only one exception. This one exception is the 
right individuals have to defend themselves.138 If the sovereign is unwilling or unable to 
protect a given individual or group, then that individual or group has the inalienable right 















Lastly, for the Hobbesian concept of the social contract to work, particularly in 
terms of the maintenance of sovereign power, individuals must collectively agree to not 
only surrender their individual rights to the sovereign, but also the rights of their 
“descendants.”139 As Cole states: 
It is clear that, if such a theory is to be upheld, it can stand only by the 
view, which Hobbes shares with Grotius, that a man can alienate not 
merely his own liberty, but also that of his descendants, and that, 
consequently, a people as a whole can do the same.140 
This implication is necessary for the Hobbesian social contract to be valid or have 
any sustainability. If the transference of rights was based on individual generations, then 
the sovereign's right to rule and its legitimacy would be called into question in each 
subsequent generation. As such, the Hobbesian social contract is “irrevocable.”141 Once 
the initial covenant is made, the contract is considered binding for subsequent 
generations. Hobbes points out that once the initial contract is initiated there can be no 
breach of covenant.142 The sovereign can do no wrong or commit any injustice other then 
failing to uphold its obligations via the contract.143 The reason for this, according to 
Hobbes, is that due to the collective agreement to transfer rights to the sovereign, every 
139Cole, xxvi. 
140Ibid. 
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individual is implicitly responsible for the sovereign’s actions.144 Therefore, not only are 
the masses subject to whatever actions the sovereign deems necessary, but the masses 
cannot speak up and accuse the sovereign of any wrong doing because by giving the 
sovereign state power and ultimately granting legitimacy to the sovereign, they are 
themselves responsible for the sovereign’s actions. This is because the positive 
consequences of having a sovereign capable of ending the state of nature is more 
desirable then the negative consequences of having a sovereign whose oppressive actions 
cannot be limited as long as it maintains its obligation under the social contact to end the 
state of nature. 
But what would be the consequences if a minority of individuals refused to 
initially transfer their rights to the sovereign, or they subsequently refused to abide by its 
decrees? Hobbes implies that they would be treated as if they were in the state of nature 
or as if they were an “enemy” of the state.145 These individuals would inevitability be 
seen as violating the basis of the contract and the rules of civil society established by the 
sovereign, and subsequently, the sovereign would then be obligated to take action against 
them. Consequently, these individuals would be expelled from the commonwealth, 
jailed, or possibly killed. The following illustrates this point: 
Either you have agreed, he [Hobbes] says, to transfer your power 
to the sovereign or you have not. If you have, then you are stopped from 
disputing the acts of the sovereign. If you have not, you declare yourself a 
144Ibid. 
145 Pollock, 294. 
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stranger to the State, and therefore the State has no duties towards you and 
146 may treat you as an enemy. 
Without the social contract and the duties and obligations incumbent on the 
parties in question, life would be terrible for humans.147 Furthermore, without the state, 
there could be none of the advantages that state control bring such as civilization, social 
structure, economic structure, intellectual endeavors, art, or the rights associated with 
possession of private property.148 Consequently, Hobbes posits that any system of state 
control is preferable to the state of nature.149 Based on this assumption, Hobbes suggests 
that the sovereign may institute any type of political system it deems necessary as long as 
it fulfills its obligations under the social contract.150 As a result, Hobbesian sovereign 
power may exhibit any character, from the most liberal democracy to the most repressive 
dictatorship.151 The conditions of the state of nature necessitate the need for the state 
even if the sovereign authority is repressive or despotic. In other words, “the state of 
146Ibid. 






nature was so unendurable that sheer prudence dictated the acceptance of tyranny from 
one rather than endure violence from all.”152 
Summarizing Statements 
In conclusion, this chapter establishes the scope of Hobbes’s political philosophy 
specifically focusing on his conception of the egoistic state of nature. These conceptions 
are important for understanding the applicability of Hobbes’s ideas as a framework for 
analyzing the causes of political violence such as the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
152 Ibid. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE APPLICATION OF HOBBES’S CONCEPT OF THE EGOISTIC STATE 
OF NATURE TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CONDITIONS THAT 
LED TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that, in the absence of a global sovereign, 
the anarchical state-of-war conditions prevalent in international relations resemble the 
Hobbesian egoistic state of nature and that it is these conditions that breed acts of 
political violence such as the September 11 terrorist attacks. The natural egoistic 
tendencies outlined in Chapter 3 are pervasive in individuals. Hobbes notes that in the 
absence of a sovereign political authority these tendencies would lead to a type of 
equality that result in the state of nature. Extending these conceptions to international 
relations, it can be shown that Hobbes’s theory (indirectly supported by Machiavelli and 
Bacon) provides the basis for the proof that a type of international state of nature exists in 
the global political arena.1 In essence, the same “law of nature” that applies to relations 
among individuals applies to relations among political actors acting out in global 
1 Headley Bull, ed., “The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International 
Relations,” in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and 




affairs. Consequently, the noted Hobbesian egoistic behaviors are continually expressed 
in the political actions that global political actors facilitate in the international political 
arena. In other words, “Hobbes believed that [political actors] . . . assumed the personal 
qualities of men.”3 
Extending Hobbes’s perspective to the anarchical conditions prevalent in 
international affairs yields the following observations: 
1. There is no international sovereign to restrain political actors from exercising 
their egoistic behaviors; and, 
2. It is probable that at least some human political actors will behave in egoistic 
ways at least some of the time. 
In terms of the former, it is an empirical fact that no international sovereign exists 
in the global political arena. The United Nations is not an international political authority 
with global sovereign power.4 It is a non-governmental organization (NGO) with an 
imbalanced distribution of power, with its more powerful member states and 
2 ... . . 
Suganmi, Hidemi, “Grotius and International Equality,” in Hugo Grotius and 
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organizations having more authority than its less powerful ones.5 In addition, the UN is 
many times ineffective and inconsistent in its ability to limit violent conflict in the global 
political arena and does little to circumvent the state-of-nature conditions in it.6 The 
terrorist actions taken by al Qaeda and many of the foreign policy initiatives taken by the 
G. W. Bush Administration after the September 11 attacks reflect this reality. 
Specifically, both political actor—al Qaeda and the G.W. Bush Administration—ignore the 
mandates of the UN and continue to initiate state-of-war actions for the stated goals of 
either carrying out a war against the “Great Satan,” or a “War on Terror,” respectively. 
Both of these stated goals reflect the egoistic tendencies of political actors as they take 
political actions based on diffidence, conservation, and the pursuit of interests. It is true 
that human political actors in leadership positions may in some instances behave in a 
non-egoistic manner. However, one major political act, which is based on egoistic 
behaviors, could provoke a scenario that leads to devastating political violence that could 
last for years and resultantly exacerbate the state-of-war conditions already prevalent in 
the international state of nature. World War I provides one clear illustration of this. 
Certainly, one of the motivations of imperial Germany in provoking World War I was to 
add to the glorification of the German state. Glorification is a main Hobbesian egoistic 
tendency. This tendency toward glorification was pushed forward by an intense 
nationalism that survived German failure in World War I, resurfaced under the Third 
5 Ivor Richard Fung, “Organizing Collective Security: African Experiences,” in 
Bridges to the Future: Prospects for Peace and Security in Southern Africa, ed. Hans- 
Joachim Spanger and Peter Vale (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 73. 
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Reich, and culminated in World War II.7 This example provides an illustration of how 
the egoistic tendency toward self-glorification can lead to international conflict. 
Correspondingly, the noted Hobbesian egoistic tendencies applied to political 
actors yields the following propositions: 
1. If human political actors make the decisions for states (or nation-states) and for 
political transnational groups and these human political actors are subject to the same 
egoistic tendencies as everyone else, then it follows that these tendencies are reflected in 
at least some elements of the decision-making process of these actors; 
2. Because states, transnational groups, and other political organizations are 
controlled and manipulated by human political actors, they take on some of the egoistic 
characteristics of individuals; 
3. In the absence of an international political sovereign with sufficient authority, 
a set of circumstances are thrust upon human political actors that motivate them to 
o 
behave as if they were in a Hobbesian state of nature and; 
4. These conceptualizations, placed within the anarchical conditions of global 
relations, lead to violence within the international state of nature. 
7Louis Snyder, German Nationalism: The Tradegy of a People (Port Washington, 
New York: Stackpole, 1969), 236. 
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The Correlation between Hobbes’s State of Nature, the International State of 
Nature, and the Causes of Global Political Violence 
Humans in the Hobbesian state of nature and political actors in the international 
state of nature are both free and have the right to exhibit their natural egoistic tendencies 
and do anything they deem necessary in pursuit of their perceived interests and 
conservation.9 It is these egoistic tendencies that are facilitated by human political actors 
and expressed through the political apparatuses of the institutions or organizations that 
they represent that lead to the conditions in the international state of nature.10 
Additionally, in the absence of an international sovereign, there is no restraint on political 
actors acting out in the international state of nature beyond the limitations of their 
respective power capabilities and the imposition from other political actors. Because 
egoistic tendencies are natural and dominant in the behavior of human political actors and 
because of the existence of the international state of nature, “international war remains 
inevitable.”11 
However, war is not the only form of political violence carried out in the 
international state of nature. Non-conventional organized acts of violence, such as the 
facilitation of terrorist acts, provide mechanisms for less powerful political actors to 
engage in political violence. In order to understand the relevance of these elements to the 
causes of political violence, such as the September 11 attacks, it is helpful to infer the 
9 David P. Fidler and Stanley Hoffmann, ed., introduction to Rousseau on 




aforementioned propositions regarding Hobbes’s conceptions of the egoistic state of 
nature and apply them to the state-of-war conditions prevalent in international relations. 
Hobbes identifies the international state of nature as follows: 
[A condition of anarchy exists where]... in all times, Kings, and Persons 
of Sovereign authority, because of their Independency, are in continual 
jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons 
pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, 
Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdoms; and continual 
Spyes upon their neighbors; wherein particular men were in a condition of 
war one against another; which is a posture of War.12 
The international state of nature is further characterized by a “fragmentation” of 
solidarity among global political actors.13 This fragmentation reflects the individualism 
of egoistic human behavior as exhibited by human political actors. Based on these 
realities, the international state of nature, placed within a Hobbesian framework, is a 
global ordering characterized by a lack of sufficient international political authority 
and/or definitive international law.14 In the absence of sufficient global political 
authority and/or definitive international law, hierarchical political coalitions evolve that 
reflect the relative power of various actors. Therefore, power politics, in the ultimate 
sense, is Hobbes’s concept of the international state of nature. Implicit in Hobbes’s view 
is the point that there are so many varied political actors interacting in the global arena, 
12 Hobbes, Leviathan, 85. 
13 Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles; Or, the Setting of American Foreign 
Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 323. 
14 Raymond Aron, “The Anarchical Order of Power,” Daedalus 124 (1995): 27- 
30. 
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with competing interests and desires, that this in itself is a cause of violent hostilities.15 
Furthermore, in the absence of an international sovereign authority, the state of war 
conditions that exist dictate that political violence can conceivably be just and honorable 
and ultimately in the interests of the state, organization, or group that successfully attacks 
its competitors.16 
To extend Hobbes’s conceptions to the state-of-war conditions that exist in 
international relations beyond these realities, it is necessary to show that the international 
state of nature does exist as a real political phenomenon and is related in key ways to the 
Hobbesian state of nature. Toward that end, Boucher posits that: “Hobbes, in a number 
of places, invites the comparison of international relations with the unmitigated war of 
everyman against everyman that is characteristic of the mere state of nature in which 
Hobbes’s individualism is at its most rampant.”17 Accordingly, Dennis Pirages points out 
that the hostilities of the Hobbesian state of nature are congruent with the hostilities 
present in the international political arena: 
It has long been recognized that international politics is the epitome 
of the Hobbesian state of nature: despite all the progress over the centuries 
toward the rule of international law, sovereign states, unlike the citizens 
within each state, acknowledge no law or authority higher than their own 
15 Murphy, 477. 
16 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: The Latin Version, Entitled in the First Edition 
Elementorum Philosophi? Sectio Tertia De Cive, and in later editions Elementa 
Philosophica, trans. Howard Warrender (Oxford England: Oxford University, 1983), 150. 
17 David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From 
Thucydides to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 145. 
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self-interest; they are therefore free to do as they please, subject only to 
gross prudential restraints, no matter what the cost to the world 
community.18 
As noted, in the Hobbesian state of nature individuals have the right to ensure their 
individual conservation and self-interests in any manner that their dimensions of power 
and abilities allow. Similarly, political actors have the same right to provide for the 
conservation and self-interest of their respective state or political apparatus. Because 
there is no definitive international political authority, no political actor acting out in the 
global arena “submits to ... [any] higher law than the safety of [its] ... realm.”19 
Because there is no definitive international political sovereign, or objective 
morality, political leaders must behave as if they were in a state of nature,21 taking 
actions to ensure the interests of their respective political institutions. The following 
statements illustrate this point: 
For Hobbes ... [political institutions] were, with respect to each 
other, in a condition analogous to what prevails among individuals in a 
state of nature .... The laws that dictate to men what they ought to do and 
avoid with regard to one another are addressed to sovereign princes in 
18 • • , , Dennis Pirages, “The Origins of Ecopolitics: The Impending Revolution,” in 
Toward a Just World Order, ed. Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 474. 
19 Murphy, 485. 
20 Jahn Beate, The Cultural Construction of International Relations: The 
Invention of the State of Nature (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 150. 
21 Hobbes, Leviathan, 85. 
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their mutual relations. Above all, each . . . [political actor] has the same 
right, in protecting the safety of his people, that a particular man has in 
protecting the safety of his own body.22 
In a state of nature, according to Hobbes, the ability to take desirable things from others 
and maintain control of these things is a “right,” which is only dictated by abilities and 
power. Hobbes posits that it is a “right of nature” to exercise power without external 
interference.24 By definition, if state actors have the “right” (defined by Hobbes as the 
pursuit of self-interest) to behave as if they are in a state of nature in international affairs, 
then non-state terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, cannot realistically be expected to act 
any differently. No global actor will behave in a way that is antithetical to the state of 
war conditions that exist in the global political arena if other actors are not willing to do 
the same. Moreover, based on the fact that each political actor expects other actors to 
be diffident and willing to carry out violence for the purpose of interests and 
conservation, then why should any actor (state or non-state) forfeit its right to do the 
same?26 Based on this rationale, it is conceivable that forfeiting the right to carry out 
22 Murphy, 484-485. 
9 9 
Hobbes, Leviathan, 85. 
24 Ibid., 86. 
9 r # 
Norman E. Bowie and Robert L. Simon, The Individual and the Political 
Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1986), 233-234. 
26 Ibid. 
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violence for self-interested reasons could make a global actor “vulnerable to more 
11 predatory actors.” 
If this view is accurate, then the following question arises: Why should state 
actors, such as the United States, reasonably expect a terrorist actor, such as al Qaeda, to 
cease political violence when state actors facilitate acts of violence on a continual basis? 
For example, the levels of political violence the G. W. Bush Administration facilitates in 
Afghanistan and Iraq conceivably gives al Qaeda (as well as other anti-American, non¬ 
state political actors) a basis for intensifying the levels of their own political violence 
perpetuated as terrorist attacks. Consequently, non-state political actors such as al Qaeda 
may see their acts of political violence as legitimate in the same manner that the Bush 
Administration views its actions in Afghanistan and Iraq as legitimate. If this is the case, 
then these realities simply reflect the relativity of perception and morality as identified by 
Hobbes and delineated in this study. Applying Hobbes’s conception of moral relativity to 
the state-of-war conditions present in the international state of nature lends itself to the 
idea that conceptions of right or wrong, good or bad, justified or not justified, legitimate 
or non-legitimate, simply respond to the perceptive inclinations of the respective actors 
and have no objective basis for defining the morality of a political act. As noted, in 
Hobbesian theory, morality only evolves under the veil of a sovereign political authority. 
Political actions taken by actors in the state-of-nature conditions prevalent in the global 
political arena are characterized as rights and reflect the concept of razôn de estado, 
27 Ibid. 
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raison d'état or the “necessity of state”. 8 These concepts have traditionally been applied 
to the rights of states to act in the international state of nature, and powers and abilities 
are the only limit to these rights. However, these concepts are extended within this study 
to include transnational groups such as al Qaeda. The reasoning for this is as follows: 
1. While it is true that political transnational groups like al Qaeda are not 
sovereign entities, it is also true that sovereignty, in an of itself, is not necessary nor alone 
sufficient for a political actor to significantly influence international relations; 
2. While it is true that sovereignty can expand the dimensions of power and 
increase the level of capabilities that are available to actors, sovereignty alone is not a 
guarantee of becoming a relevant player in the global political arena; 
3. In terms of al Qaeda, its lack of sovereignty and its ability to operate across 
national borders to build a “multinationals alliance of terrorist groups” provide an 
operational advantage for both recruiting and the facilitation of terrorist acts; 
4. Within the state-of-war circumstances prevalent in international relations, self- 
interest and conservation conceptualized as reason or necessity of state is extended to 
transnational groups, such as al Qaeda, who view their “right” to carryout political 
violence as being the same as sovereign nation-states who view their “right” to do the 
same; 
28Stephen James Rupp, Allegories of Kingship: Calderon and the Anti- 
Machiavellian Tradition (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1996), 24; and Friedrich Meinecke and Douglas Scott, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of 
Raison D'état and Its Place in Modern History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1957), 5. 
29 Rohan Gunaranta, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: 
Berkley publishing group, a division of Penguin Group - USA, 2002), 297. 
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5. Transnational groups such as al Qaeda have made themselves significant 
political actors within the international arena through the use of destructive and theatrical 
political terrorism such as the September 11 attacks;30 
6. The fact that al Qaeda is characterized as a major threat to the most powerful 
country in the world has solidified, at least for the time being, its role as a major global 
political actor that has to be acknowledged; and 
7. Political transnational groups, such as al Qaeda, are viewed in this study as 
being conceptually similar to sovereign nation-states in the sense that they interact and 
affect the dissemination of power in the international political arena. 
The above-stated views outline the applicability of the concept of reason of state 
to transnational actors like al Qaeda. The concept of reason or necessity of state is, in 
part, attributed to Machiavelli who was influenced in this area by Livy, Aristotle, and 
Xenephon. Reason or necessity of state is characterized by the realization that all 
political leaders have the right to act and are “justified in acting solely on the principle of 
. . . interest.” More specifically, self-interest, characterized as reason or necessity of 
state, is illustrated by Meinecke where he points out that global political actors are 
obliged to embrace violence due to “a high degree of causal necessity, which the agent 
on # 
Jane Corbin, Al-Qaeda: The Terror Network that Threatens the World (New 
York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002), xvi-xviii. 
Meinecke, 26. 
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Ralph Barton Perry, The Present Conflict of Ideals: A Study of the 
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himself [i.e., the political actor] is accustomed to [and]... is ... part of the very essence 
of all action prompted by raison d'état.”33 
Al Qaeda, as a less powerful, non-state actor acting out in the international state 
of nature, seeks to compete politically with more powerful state actors such as the United 
States. This represents the attempt by a weaker political actor to adopt offensive means, 
based on that actor's perception of causal necessity, for the purposes of competing with a 
more powerful actor.34 Meinecke's model yields some interesting conclusions once al 
Qaeda is weighted in as an international political actor. Firstly, al Qaeda's inability to 
carryout conventional warfare against American interests limits its offensive military 
options. Secondly, based on this reality, it is possible to rationally view terrorist attacks, 
such as September 11, as representing causal necessity for al Qaeda in its attempt to use 
offensive means to compete with the hegemonic power of the United States, its allies, and 
client states.35 
The Hypothetical and Historical Conceptualizations of the International State of Nature 
as a Cause of Violent Conflict in Global Affairs 
In Hobbes’s view, state-of-nature conditions are represented by two different 
elements (the hypothetical state of nature and the historical state of nature). The first 
element, as outlined in Chapter 3, is the hypothetical state of nature, which illustrates the 
conditions that would exist among domestic societies in the absence of sovereign political 




• 36 authority. In essence, Hobbes’s argument for the state of nature is “hypothetical... [, 
and] the actual existence of the state of nature is not required for the success of his 
argument.” The second element is historical, i.e., the “historical” state of nature is 
represented in the conflict of “warring groups” and has evolved into the state- of-war 
conditions prevalent in the international state of nature.38 It is these latter conditions that 
lead to global political violence such as the September 11 attacks. Boucher notes that in 
terms of the former, “there never was a time, Hobbes admits, when ... [the hypothetical 
or individual state of nature] was sufficiently prevalent to constitute a condition in which 
every individual was at war with every other.”39 Consequently, the Hobbesian state of 
nature is simply a hypothetical exercise used by Hobbes to illustrate the necessity of 
political authority.40 
However, according to Beate, the historical state of nature did exist and it 
consisted of group conflict that provided the basis for international hostilities and 
ultimately the violent conditions prevalent in contemporary international affairs.41 
Toward that end, the importance of the state of nature “still lies at the heart of 
36 Boucher, 149. 
37 Bowie, 13. 
38 Boucher, 149. 
39 Ibid., 145. 
40 Ibid., 145-149. 
41 Beate, 150. 
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mainstream contemporary international relations theory [and] . . . carries with it the same 
normative assumptions and political implications it had for classical thinkers.”42 A 
comparative analysis regarding the hypothetical state of nature and the state-of-nature 
conditions prevalent in group conflict provides an understanding of the relationship 
between Hobbes’s concept of the state of nature and conditions prevalent in international 
affairs. For example, Boucher states: 
The ... [hypothetical state of nature] is constructed by Hobbes 
through scientific, or philosophical, demonstration, that is, the 
achievement of conditional knowledge. ... In comparing the . . . 
[hypothetical] state of nature with the historical.. . condition we will see 
that Hobbes did actually believe that the modified [historical], as opposed 
to the mere [hypothetical], state of nature did exist.... In both accounts 
he believed that relations between warring groups, rather than warring 
individuals, constituted the norm,.. ,43 
This quote highlights the point that Hobbes did, in fact, view the state of nature as being 
reflected in realistic, historical conditions existing not between each individual, but 
between warring groups. It is these warring groups that evolved into tribes, villages, 
cities, city-states, and ultimately nation-states that represent the roots of international 
conflict. These stages are briefly discussed later in this chapter. 
This study conceptualizes al Qaeda as representing a warring group carrying out 
violence for the purpose of facilitating group conflict. It is the facilitation of this group 
conflict that leads to violent political acts such as the September 11 attacks. Therefore, 
the terrorism of September 11 reflects the Hobbesian conception of the existence of the 
42 Ibid. 
43 Boucher, 149. 
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historical state of nature and ultimately the international state of nature as a realistic 
illustration of conflict among warring groups. 
The existence of the historical or international state of nature can be 
illustrated further through T. M. Franck’s analysis of John Rawls’ 
‘original position.’44 If, according to Franck, Rawls’ subsequent 
conclusions regarding the choices that an individual in the original 
position would make were extended to actors in international relations, 
then conditions similar to the Hobbesian state of nature would result.45 
Franck explains this delineation in the following way: 
Is it possible for states’ representatives, in the original position, 
negotiating behind the veil of ignorance, to arrive at an applicable 
principle of justice to guide their actions? What might such a principle 
look like ... ? 
While the state of nature may, indeed, describe one tendency in 
contemporary Realpolitik, it would be exceedingly odd if that were to 
coincide with an ideal of justice. Such coincidence between what the 
negotiators in the original position agree upon, and Hobbes's state of 
nature, should warn us that something must be wrong with the model 
producing that result.46 
Franck’s position is that political actors representing political institutions and 
organizations in the global arena, put in Rawls’ original position, would choose 
alternatives that would lead to an international state of nature. Implicitly, the first reason 
for this is that anarchy (as it exists in global relations) is not based on a fair system of 
justice, but rather on the unabridged right of actors to pursue their security and interests 
in any way they see fit. Therefore, in the absence of a sovereign political authority, (such 
as that which would exist in a domestic setting capable of enforcing any rational 
agreement between the individuals negotiating behind the “veil of ignorance”) no rational 
44 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: 




global political actor would willingly give up its right to ensure its own security and 
pursuit of interests. Furthermore, the veil of ignorance, where no actor knows their 
specific power capabilities, would potentially encourage most to choose an anarchical 
state of nature where weaker actors have the right to make themselves stronger and 
stronger actors have the right to increase their power. The implications of Rawls’s theory 
for international relations, put within a framework that takes into consideration the 
absence of an international sovereign, would be completely different from the 
implications of his theory for a domestic society, consisting of a sovereign political 
authority. 
The Role of Equality and Diffidence in the International State of Natureas a Cause of 
Violent Conflict such as the September 11 Attacks 
It is the Hobbesian concept of equality that represents a relevant link between 
Hobbes’s hypothetical state of nature and the international state of nature in terms of the 
causes of violent conflict. If no civil sovereign authority exist, then the egoistic 
tendencies of self-interested behavior and the pursuit of conservation and glorification 
leads to diffidence in individuals and ultimately to the state of nature. By applying this 
concept to political actors in international relations, it is possible to show that equality 
leads to diffidence and ultimately violent conflict among political actors in the global 
political arena. The equality that Hobbes conceptualizes is not necessarily an equality of 
equals, but rather an equality of desire to express and fulfill the stated egoistic tendencies 
facilitated as goals and objectives.47 This is reflected in some of the goals of al Qaeda. 
For example, the equality of the desire to express and fulfill the stated egoistic tendencies 
47 Hobbes, Leviathan, 82. 
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illustrates the previously stated point that al Qaeda realizes that it cannot compete with 
the overwhelming force of the United States in a conventional military conflict. 
However, the organization is determined to challenge the United States’ power and 
dominance in some competitive form48 This competition takes on the character of 
political violence facilitated as terrorist acts such as the September 11 attacks. The desire 
to compete with the United States represents the equality of will to achieve political goals 
through political violence, just as America, its allies, and client states use political 
violence to achieve some of their political goals. The level of the political violence or the 
capability to facilitate this violence may not be equal, but the desire to achieve interest- 
based goals through violence is relatively equal. In addition to this application of the 
Hobbesian concept of equality, the most extreme example of state-of-war conditions in 
international relations—nuclear weapons—is worth noting in regards to the role of 
equality in causing violent global conflict. For example, Gauthier posits that: 
The advent of nuclear weapons .. . has introduced a new element into the 
equation. If nuclear proliferation advances at its present rate,... then an 
ever increasing number of nations will come to share this dreadful 
equality. And so we may look to Hobbes’s account of the natural 
condition of mankind, with a view to understanding better our own 
international situation.49 
This statement by Gauthier, written in 1969, has proven to be predictive. For 
example, since the “Axis of Evil” statement by G. W. Bush regarding Iran, Iraq, and 
AQ 
Paul Williams, Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror (USA: Alpha-A Pearson 
Education Company, 2002), 3-7. 
49 Boucher, 207-208. 
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North Korea, we have seen the reinstatement of the North Korean nuclear program.50 
Additionally, Iran is putting serious resources into the development of its own nuclear 
program.51 Correspondingly, al Qaeda is attempting to acquire nuclear capability and 
know-how of its own due to the fact that this technology is potentially attainable via the 
international black market and the ex-Soviet military apparatus.52 Besides the threat of a 
nuclear attack, the organization could seek to set off a “dirty bomb,” which: 
[Potentially,]... could be paired with conventional explosives and 
turned into a crude, non-fissionable atomic bomb .... For example, a 
combination fertilizer truck bomb with radioactive agents could have not 
only destroyed one of the World Trade Center's towers, but also rendered 
a considerable chunk of prime real estate in one of the world's financial 
nerve centers indefinitely unusable because of radioactive contamination. 
The prospect not only of the resulting disruption to commerce, but of the 
attendant publicity and enhanced coercive power of terrorists armed with 
such ‘dirty’ bombs (arguably a more credible risk than terrorist acquisition 
of fissile nuclear weapons), is deeply disturbing.53 
The equality equation within international relations would most likely change if al 
Qaeda acquires even a limited nuclear/radioactive threat trajectory. Furthermore, if the 
organization does initiate a nuclear or dirty bomb attack on an American target, the U.S. 
50 “Seymor Hersh’s Timeline of North Korean Nuclear Program: Who is to 
Blame? [sic],” [resource online] (Earthlink.net, accessed 12 March 2003); available from 
http://home.earthlink.net/~platter/misc/nk-nuke-timeline.html; Internet; quoted in “The 
51Peter Rudolf, “Critical Engagement: The European Union and Iran,” in 
Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe, and Problem Countries, ed. Richard 
N. Haass (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999), 88. 




Government does not have a specific al Qaeda target to retaliate against. Because al 
Qaeda is a non-sovereign actor, there is no specific territorial or geographic area of land 
to attack. Consequently, with a transnational actor such as al Qaeda, the concept of 
deterrence is useless. From a strategic standpoint, the following question evolves: How 
can nuclear deterrence be effective since the al Qaeda leadership realizes that the United 
States has no specific target to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike against? This example 
illustrates the desire of subordinate political actors to equalize their destructive 
willingness with a dominant political actor. As noted, this equalization of want is not an 
equality of the potential for destruction, but rather an equality of the desire to facilitate 
political violence as a competitive mechanism against a more dominant political actor. 
Even a small-scale attack with a battlefield nuclear weapon or dirty bomb would 
cause havoc and chaos in the United States. The threat of a minimum nuclear or dirty 
bomb attack by Iran, North Korea, or al Qaeda on American soil or against American 
interests is equal to the threat of a massive nuclear attack by the United States against one 
of these actors. The fear factor of even a minimum nuclear/dirtybomb attack against 
American interests or on American soil is, in and of itself, an equalizing mechanism in 
terms of the thought processes of subordinate global political actors (like al Qaeda) or 
nation-states that feel threatened by or that are competing with the U.S. 
Another sense of equality implicit in the Hobbesian international state of nature 
framework is described by George Soros as being synonymous to George Orwell’s 
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Animal Farm where “all animals are equal but some are more equal than others.”54 This 
view represents the dominant-subordinate conditions in the international state of nature 
and reflects a “horizontal authority” and a hierarchical order developed and maintained 
through the exercise of power and force.55 This international power hierarchy is 
analogous to the nature of groups in primitive societies that are absent of sovereign 
political authority: The law of‘primitive societies,’ [is] absent of centralized government 
enforcing it and, thus, has to be enforced by certain groups within society itself. It 
consists only of primary rules and lacks the secondary ones, the rules about rules. Hence, 
international law differs from civil law and is more like the law that existed among 
“primitive cultures”.56 This position illustrates the following conceptions: 
1. There is a discernable difference between the conditions of equality that exist 
within domestic societies consisting of civil authority and primitive societies with no 
established civil authority; 
2. There is a discernable difference between the conditions of equality that exist 
within domestic societies, with civil authority, and the international political arena, absent 
of an international political sovereign; 
54 George Soros, “America’s Global Role: Why the Fight for a Worldwide Open 
Society Begins at Home,” The American Prospect, [magazine on-line] (Boston: The 
American Prospect On-line, June 2003, accessed 5 July 2003); available from 
http://www.soros.org/gsbio/american_prospect_052703.htm; Internet. 
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3. The international state of nature most “resembles” the conditions of equality 
prevalent in primitive societies with little or no sovereign authority; 
4. In societies with a political/civil authority the sovereign power establishes and 
enforces the “secondary rules” of society; 
5. However, in the absence of a sovereign authority, groups within primitive 
societies enforce “primary rules” and this is congruent with the international state of 
nature, wherein (in the absence of an international sovereign authority) more powerful 
political actors (like the United States) enforce “primary rules” that are often in their own 
perceived self-interests; and 
6. Ultimately, even though a state of nature exists in international relations, there 
are “rules” that are established and enforced by the more powerful actors that are 
designed to serve their perceived self-interests.57 
While the international state of nature is a state of war, it is not a constant state of 
war because, as Hoffman contends, “there are forces capable of ensuring a minimum of 
r o 
order.” However, these forces tend to be more powerful political actors (hegemonic 
actors) that constrict or expand the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international 
political arena in their own interests. For example, the United States, as the world’s only 
remaining superpower, facilitates and initiates certain primary rules on the world order. 
Specifically, since the September 11 incident, the G. W. Bush Administration has 
facilitated these primary rules through policies based upon American military dominance. 
57 Franck, 184. 
58 Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy Or World Order: American Foreign Policy since 
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This proliferation of American military might has been facilitated through increases in 
military expenditures. For example, in 2003 the U.S. Government spent $396.1 billion, 
or 17.8 percent of the entire federal budget on military expenditures and another $187 
billion for the occupation in Iraq.59 This amount of military spending surpasses the 
military spending of 25 nation-states.60 Despite these realities, the G. W. Bush 
Administration has continuously carried out political violence and threatened other 
political actors for their possession and/or presumed attempts to procure weapons of mass 
destruction. The Administration has attacked and occupied Iraq under the guise of 
destroying weapons of mass destruction, while Iran, Syria, and North Korea have all been 
threatened for their possession of or perceived attempts to acquire these weapons, as well. 
These actions on the part of the United States represent the enforcement of primary rules 
by a hegemonic actor in the international state of nature in the same way that more 
powerful groups enforce certain primary rules on other groups in a primitive state of 
nature absent of sufficient sovereign authority. 
The facilitation of the primary rules by a hegemonic power, in this case the U.S., 
in the international state of nature may conceivably be perceived by certain political 
59 Gilles D’Aymery, comp. “U.S. Military Budget for FY 2003,” [on-line 
database] (Swans, 6 March 2002, accessed 30 April, 2002); available from 
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actors, such as al Qaeda, as being in opposition to their interests. Placed within a 
Hobbesian perspective, this represents the possibility that al Qaeda, its operatives, and its 
supporters may conceivably view the hegemonic control by the U.S. as being worse than 
a complete state of nature, absent of even primary rules. 
A hegemonic hierarchy, such as the one the G. W. Bush Administration has 
attempted to facilitate after the September 11 attacks, represents the attempt of a powerful 
actor to exert dominance of less powerful subordinate actors over other actors. This is 
parallel to existence of “an unequal alliance”61 of actors in international relations. This 
represents the prevalence of an “empirically demonstrable power hierarchy” that exists in 
international relations.62 What this power hierarchy reflects is the existence of a 
“community of interests” controlled by a dominant political actor who has specific goals 
and objectives. This dominant political actor [the United States] controls its community 
of interests and dictates policy to the degree that its power capabilities allow. Current 
members of this United States-led community of interests that are significant to the 
concerns of this study are Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Israel, and 
Egypt. While some of these actors are ideologically or religiously opposed themselves, 
such as the noted Arab states and Israel, it is the United States as the dominant leader of 
the coalition that provides the cohesive element in the mix of competing interests. 
61 Edwin Dewitt Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 50. 
62 Franck, 10. 
/TO • • , 
William Christie MacLeod, The Origin and History of Politics (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1931), 5. 
125 
However, when other political actors feel that their interests have been forcibly 
subordinated to the dominant interests of the American-led coalition, they may resort to 
acts of political violence such as terrorism to compete with the dominant power brought 
to bear by the American-led coalition. 
This study posits that al Qaeda represents a political actor whose perceived 
interests have been left out of the community of interests propagated by the United 
States, its allies, and client states. The only way that al Qaeda believes that it can 
compete with the American-led community of interests is through acts of political 
violence designed to motivate the coalition to recognized and/or accommodate al Qaeda’s 
perceived interests. Such acts of political violence are facilitated by subordinate political 
actors to establish a “balance of terror” that serves to compete with dominant political 
actors.64 
The perception of being a subordinate actor on the part of al Qaeda and its 
supporters is similar to the power position of less powerful actors being dominated in 
domestic societies by more powerful actors. In this example the dominant actor develops 
a network of interests and protects and facilitates its and the network’s interests at the 
expense of the repressed, subordinate groups whose interests are left out of any relevant 
considerations.65 As Hagen notes, “the political repression gradually convinces the mass 
of the people (subordinate actors), increasingly bitter under their frustration and 
64 Hoffmann, 108. 
65Everett E. Hagen, “A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political 
Change,” in Readings in Modem Political Analysis, ed. Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. 
Neubauer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 188-189. 
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humiliation, that they can find no relief in moderate movements for reform, and it 
gradually breeds in them bitterness and rage [and ultimately] .. . violence and 
extremism.”66 This analytical scenario provides the basis for an understanding of the 
popular support for al Qaeda and its agenda on the part of some Muslims. 
The United States-led hierarchical community of interests that currently exist in 
the international state of nature is antithetical to the traditional concepts of balance of 
power politics and may potentially provide the basis for increased violent hostilities in 
global affairs. Rourke defines balance of power as an “equilibrium of power in the world 
[designed]... to prevent any country or coalition of countries from dominating the 
system.67 Hoffman contends that balance of power politics provides the basis for some 
degree of order in the otherwise state-of-war conditions prevalent in the global political 
arena. This view, suggests Hoffman, represents a trend in European political thought 
where “European political thinkers have had a way of presenting the balance of power as 
about as moderate and reasonable an arrangement as one has the right to expect in the 
international state of nature and as the crowning achievement of a golden age in 
diplomacy and international law.”69 The European concept of the balance of power 
eventually evolved into Cold War bipolarity and effectively served to limit conflict 
66 Ibid. 
67 Rourke, 17. 
68 Hoffmann, 99. 
69 Ibid. 
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70 • between the U.S.-led community of interests and the Soviet Bloc. However, both sides 
initiated hostilities carried out in the form of surrogate wars in subordinate societies as 
well as their respective client states.71 The view that an equalizing balance of power in 
the global political arena provides a rationale for the best means of restraint in the 
international state of nature war is congruent with Hobbes’s conceptions regarding 
limiting hostilities among actors in international relations.72 Implicit in this fact, suggest 
Fidler and Hoffman, is that: 
Hobbes is,.. the father of utilitarian theories of international law and 
relations; and we can extrapolate from his theories, for policy guidance, 
the notion of the balance of power: although fragile, it is a relatively 
efficient technique for enforcing the Taws of nature’, since it corresponds 
to the interests all participants have in keeping the competition moderate.73 
However, with the end of the Cold War, the emergence of non-state transnational 
groups such as al Qaeda, and the hegemonic foreign policy initiatives taken by the G. W. 
Bush Administration after the September 11 attacks, balance of power politics have been 
subordinated to an increase in the intensification of transnational terrorism and American 
hegemonic dominance. These two political phenomena have led to an exacerbation of 
hostilities in the international state of nature. 
70 Alfonso Gonzalez, ed., introduction to The New Third World, ed. Jim Norwine 
(Boulder: Perseus, 1998), 3. 
72 Fidler and Hoffman, xliv. 
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A further exploration into this issue brings the inquiry into a discussion of the 
designation of global poles. As noted above, the conditions of a bipolar world decreased 
armed conflict among the major global political actors during the Cold War. However, in 
the conditions of the post Cold War and post September 11 world, different applications 
must be considered. In the post Cold War and post September 11 global arena, a unipolar 
global system has evolved.74 This unipolar system consists of the U.S. as the 
hegemonic, or dominant power. Resultantly, the hegemon “resists attempts by 
subordinate units to achieve independence or greater autonomy.”75 However, for actors 
who challenge the U.S.-led hierarchy, or are not within the perceived spectrum of 
American interests, this structure could be perceived as repressive. The perception of 
being victims of repression may lead actors such as Iran, Syria, and some African and 
Indonesian states with large Muslim populations, to conceivably form coalitions with 
transnational groups such as al Qaeda. The foundation for such coalition building may 
not have existed prior to the unipolar hegemonic policy initiatives of the G. W. Bush 
Administration after the September 11 attacks. As such, it is potentially possible that the 
Bush Administration’s unipolar policy initiatives have actually laid the groundwork for 
such cooperation among these actors. The basis of this coalition building is conceivably 
founded on such factors as fear, diffidence, the equality of desire to accomplish self- 
interested goals, and a desire to limit and challenge the power of the U.S.-led community 
of interests. Both the attempts of the G. W. Bush Administration to promote a U.S.-led 
74 Boyer and Rourke, 55. 
75 Ibid. 
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unipolar hegemony and the attempts of subordinate actors such as the above-stated 
nation-states and al Qaeda fit perfectly into the Hobbesian conception that political actors 
will and should seek to dominate competitors and that actors are naturally empowered to 
attack competitors in the pursuit of interests.76 
It is the attempt to dominate competitors, combined with the elements of equality 
outlined earl ier, that leads to diffidence. Chapter 3 illustrated that Hobbes's concept of 
equality leads to diffidence in the state of nature. According to Hobbes, diffidence or 
mistrust of others is a major cause of conflict in the individual state of nature. Extending 
this Hobbesian conceptualization to the conditions that exist in the global state of nature, 
Howard Warrender posits that: 
The chief source of instability and distrust in international relations, 
as in Hobbes's State of Nature, is not that men will act to meet patent 
danger, but that they will also act to meet hypothetical danger. States do 
not merely fight when they are actually attacked, but follow what are 
sometimes called in diplomatic language, abstract principles of precaution. 
It is with such actions, designed to meet potential danger, that Hobbes's 
theory is centrally concerned, and it is these actions which are only 
77 conditionally excused in his ethical theory. 
It is diffidence or distrust, therefore, which leads actors to be motivated by fear. 
This fear may not reflect a real threat to survival or interests, but rather may simply be 
based on a perceived hypothetical danger. This perception of danger based on diffidence 
may lead to the use of preemption in the international state of nature where no actor can 
consistently settle paranoid feelings of mistrust and actors are in a continual state of fear 
of attack from others. The fear of another terrorist attack and the mistrust of Muslims or 
76 Hobbes, Leviathan, 151. 
77 Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of 
Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 119. 
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people of Arab dissent rose tremendously in the United States after the September 11 
attacks. This diffidence or fear has led to the ability of the G. W. Bush Administration to 
initiate policies that never would have been possible before the attacks. Drawing 
inferences from this line of reasoning, Jim Lobe writes: 
Since Sept. 11, the Bush Administration has aggressively deployed 
U.S. troops around the globe, promised military aid to dozens of countries, 
and has unilaterally undermined the global arms-control regime — all in 
the name of a ‘war on terrorism.’ 
In just a few months, Washington has pledged or provided new 
military aid — from training, equipment or, most significantly, advisers — 
to some two dozen countries, among them Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Colombia, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen, not to mention Afghanistan, where the 
United States intends to build a national army .... 
Over the same period, Bush walked away from global negotiations 
on biological weapons control, withdrew the United States from the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, widely considered a cornerstone of 
international arms-control, and proposed increasing the defense budget in 
2003 by $48 billion. The increase alone is greater than the amount any of 
Washington's NATO allies devotes to its military in an entire year .... 
More recently, a leaked government document revealed the 
administration intends to lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons. 
The Defense Department is planning to develop smaller, more "precise" 
nuclear bombs, and may consider using them preemptively against 
78 
countries suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. 
The American public and significant elements of the American media reacted 
with diffidence to the September 11 attacks. The G. W. Bush Administration intensified 
these feelings of diffidence through the use of language designed to increase the fear 
factor in the American public. However, many of the policy initiatives taken by the Bush 
Administration after the September 11 attacks appear to have nothing to do with the acts 
78 
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of violence perpetrated on the American homeland. Jim Lobe contends that high-ranking 
members of the G. W. Bush Administration developed many of these policies as far back 
as 1991 when they were part of the elder President Bush’s Administration: 
The Bush administration’s actions fit neatly into a plan for United 
States hegemony first mapped out in a draft Pentagon paper 10 years ago. 
The secret document, known as the ‘Defense Policy Guidance,’ was 
written by two relatively obscure civilian Pentagon officials in the 
aftermath of the Gulf War. 
The main authors were Paul Wolfowitz, now the deputy secretary of 
defense and widely considered among the most hawkish of administration 
officials, and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, a lawyer who now serves as Vice 
President Dick Cheney's chief of staff and national security adviser. 
During the first Bush administration, both men were working for Cheney, 
who was defense secretary.. . 
Democratic Sen. Joseph Biden, now chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, called it a prescription for ‘a Pax 
Americana,’ or a world order enforced by U.S. power. 
The uproar subsided only after National Security Adviser Brent 
Scowcroft and then-Secretary of State James Baker prevailed on Cheney 
to tone down the final draft, which he did. Though the document may have 
been revised, administration initiatives today seem strikingly similar to the 
original. 
According to the original draft, preventing the emergence of a rival 
superpower ‘is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional 
defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile 
power from dominating a region whose resources would, under 
consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.’ 
In addition to Western Europe, these regions include ‘.. . East Asia, 
the territory of the former Soviet Union and Southwest Asia,’ the same 
three regions where the new Bush administration has been most 
promiscuous in deploying military forces since 9/11. 
Indeed, under the new world order envisaged by Wolfowitz and 
Libby a decade ago, American military intervention around the world 
would come to be seen “as a constant feature, ‘according to the draft ...’ 
Though the strategies in the document outraged many in 1992, the 
terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon seem to 
have provided the pretext for Wolfowitz, Libby, and like-minded officials 
to use a war against terror to reintroduce their 10-year-old ambitions. 
79 Ibid. 
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Additionally, three years before the September 11 attacks, the Project for the New 
American Century (PNAC), a neo-conservative strategic think tank, began crafting what 
would become current American foreign policy.80 Members of this group, many of 
whom are now high-ranking members of the G. W. Bush Administration, called for war 
in Iraq as early as January 1998 where in a letter addressed to then President Clinton they 
write: 
We are writing you because we are convinced that current American 
policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in 
the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the 
Cold War . . . That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of 
O 1 
Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. 
This letter called for the removal of the Hussein regime and the deployment of American 
troops to Iraq as far back as 1998. Moreover, just nine days after the September 11 
attacks, the group again called for an attack of Iraq attempting to link the attacks with 
Hussein: 
It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some 
form to the recent attack on the United States .. . Failure to undertake such 
an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war 
on international terrorism .... American military force should be used to 
provide a ‘safe zone’ in Iraq from which the opposition can operate. And 
American forces must be prepared to back up our commitment to the Iraqi 
[resistance] ... by all necessary means. 
80 PNAC, “Letter to Bill Clinton,” [on-line resource] (Washington, D.C.: Project 
for a New American Century, accessed 6 Januarary 1998); available from 
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No evidence has emerged that Saddam Hussein helped plan, finance, or facilitate the 
September 11 attacks. However, over 70 percent of Americans believed that he helped 
plan and facilitate the attacks. These statistics uphold the view that the American 
public was reacting out of diffidence and fear after September 11 and that the G. W. Bush 
Administration used these passions to initiate certain policy changes. Furthermore, these 
facts indicate that without the September 11 attacks and the subsequent diffidence that 
evolved in the American public and media, such aggressive foreign policy initiatives 
could not have been carried out by the Administration. By characterizing these policies 
as the “War Against Terror,” the Bush Administration framed his policies as essential 
steps to counter a state of war. Writing about the necessities of war, John Locke argues 
that it is impossible for political authority to “regulate (the) demands of war.” Locke 
further states: 
[It is true]... that a powerful people, made powerful by the material increase 
resulting from the encouragement of the desire for comfortable preservation under 
the protection of established laws of liberty, must face always the possibility of 
battle, a situation in which citizens must be dutiful, public-spirited, and ready to 
sacrifice treasure and perhaps even their lives, under the discretionary command 
of the executive federative [s/c] power, for the defense of the society as a whole.85 
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Certainly Locke’s assessment of the commonwealth’s response to war fits very well with 
the Bush Administration's policies after the September 11 attacks. Of particular 
relevance is the statement that the citizenry should defer to the “discretionary command 
of the executive federative [szc] power.” This view is parallel with the G. W. Bush 
Administration’s post September 11 policies and are best reflected in the adoption of HR 
3162 RDS, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, better known as the USA 
PATRIOT ACT.86 The degree to which this act and other measures taken after the 
September 11 attacks have infringed on the rights of American citizens in the name of 
security could prove to provide the impetus for a constitutional crisis. 
The nature of Locke’s statements is further reflected in the general attitude 
pervasive in the United States immediately after the September 11 attacks. This general 
attitude reflects the belief that the powers of the chief executive political authority should 
be extended for reasons of national security. This is congruent with the previously noted 
Hobbesian concept that the actions of the sovereign should not be questioned. This also 
reflects the important role of diffidence and fear and how they have gripped the country 
after the September 11 attacks. It should also be noted, however, that the creation of an 
environment of diffidence and fear is also one of the goals of al Qaeda in carrying out 
86 U.S. Senate, USA PATRIOT Act, HR 3162 RDS, 107th Congress 1st Session, 
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terrorist attacks. When a national crisis, such as the September 11 attacks occurs, it 
bonds a national community at the expense of exacerbating the hostilities prevalent in the 
international state of nature. After the attacks, the U.S. experienced a surge in 
nationalism initiated in congressional, U.S. media, and public support for the resulting 
policies of the G. W. Bush Administration. With the support of the media and the 
American public, the Bush Administration has expanded the hostilities in the 
international political arena to new post Cold War heights, exacerbating the state-of-war 
conditions in the global state of nature.88 The Bush Administration has done this by 
deploying military troops to many strategic areas of the world and potentially making 
certain state and non-state political actors like Iran, Syria, North Korea, and a significant 
percentage of the global Muslim community diffident regarding American foreign policy 
agendas. Additionally, there is a chance that al Qaeda will view the militarily based 
actions of the United States as a clear sign of an amplification of state of nature 
hostilities, and, subsequently, this may increase the level of its desire to sponsor other 
terrorist attacks. 
The Evolution of the International State of Nature from 
Violence Among Warring Groups to Political Violence such as the September 11 
Terrorist Attacks 
As noted, Hobbes's implies that the real historical circumstance of the state of 
nature exists between warring groups, as opposed to individuals. These warring groups 
evolved into tribes, villages, cities, city-states and eventually nation-states, with each 
respective stage being based on a simultaneous change in the respective mode of 
production, the nature of political authority, and the intensification of the level of 
88 Lobe, http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/5345; Internet. 
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hostilities between political actors.89 The four-stage approach as outlined by Adam 
Smith reflects this evolution.90 The first stage consists of hunting and fishing groups; the 
second stage, agrarian societies; the third, the domesticators of live stock; and the fourth, 
the “age of commerce.”91 Each evolutionary stage of societal development corresponds 
to an increase in private property, and thus, to an increase in the responsibilities and 
obligations of political authorities to limit domestic hostilities, protect private property92 
and provide the mechanisms for an expansion in the acquisition of the property of others, 
inclusive of the invasion of other societies for the enrichment of individuals in the 
homeland. For example, Beate points out that the political authority in Spain struggled to 
come up with new political mechanisms to accomplishment its desire to exploit the lands 
and peoples of the Americas, so that the accumulation of wealth could be filtered back to 
Spain.93 
Smith’s four-stage theory is congruent with Hobbes’s conceptions of natural law, 
competition, the role of power acquisition, and the development, necessity, and role of 
political authority. Through the use of these concepts, both Hobbes and Smith suggest 
John W. Caims, “The influence of Smith's Jurisprudence on Legal Education in 
Scotland: Legal Education and Natural Law,” in Adam Smith Reviewed, ed. Peter Jones 
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that the competitive pursuit of self-interest, power acquisition, and the desire to be master 
of other’s property is natural. Implicit in this reasoning (at least from a Hobbesian 
perspective) is the point that these natural conditions led to conflict and ultimately to 
violence as international relations became a violent struggle for the dominance of 
material wealth and resources. It is this motivation for dominance by the United States, 
its allies, and client states to which groups such as al Qaeda are violently opposed. 
Another historical basis for conflict among groups is the concept of territoriality. For 
example, Duchacek writes: 
The human race has lived for millennia in separate territorial 
compartments - local, tribal, or national-and organized its work, set 
common goals, and progressed toward them within geographically 
delineated areas, large or small. The political organization of the world is 
still primarily based on territorial divisions and subdivisions of the land 
surface and its imaginary extensions into the seas and air space. The 
territorial segments both reflect and shape geographically delineated 
territorial interests.94 
This territorial view of group conflict reflects Hobbes’s conceptions of the pursuit 
of interests, or what Duchacek designates as “territorial interests,” carried on in state of 
nature conditions. Territories containing resources such as oil, water, or minerals are 
strategically important and provide the basis for the growth and ultimately the survival of 
a society. In terms of al Qaeda, territoriality is also important, but not in the sense of 
sovereign territory. For example, the Islamic Holy places are sacred in Islamic religious 
traditions. As fundamentalists, al Qaeda views the presence of non-Islamic military 
personnel on holy ground as sacrilege.95 One example is the presence of American 
94 Duchacek, 3. 
95 Gunaranta, 117-118. 
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troops in Saudi Arabia, near the most sacred territory in Islamic tradition.96 This fact is 
continuously used by bin Laden as a rationale for attacking American interests.97 
Consequently, territory is essential to the goals of the al Qaeda leadership. Additionally, 
al Qaeda seeks to overthrow what it deems as corrupt, American-influenced Islamic 
regimes, and replace them with Islamic fundamentalist political authority. This is similar 
to the scenario that took place with the Taliban in Afghanistan.98 If successful, such a 
change in political authority would represent the acquisition of sovereign territory by al 
Qaeda. 
However, in its current capacity as a transnational actor, al Qaeda represents an 
increase in the relevance of political transnational groups in the global political arena. 
Oots contends that this reality reflects a regression or reversal of the teleological 
evolution of the nation-state from the group, where groups such as al Qaeda represent 
non-state transnational political entities.99 This multi-national ethnic and religious-based 
group association, in the form of transnational organizations, represents a challenge to the 
international authority of nation-states.100 As Oots suggests, “transnational religious 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Kamal Azfar, “Bin Laden Warns of Full Fledged Action Against U.SAusaf 
1 January 1999, 4. 
99 Kent Layne Oots, A Political Organization Approach to Transnational 
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regimes (such as al Qaeda) offer alternative access to the international community, as 
well as alternative standards and symbols of legitimacy ... Transnational actors may 
provide an enclave for Muslims who may feel that their interests are ignored by their 
respective nation-state.101 Furthermore, it is conceivable that the propagandized rhetoric 
and political terrorist attacks facilitated by Qa’ida may provide a sense of Pan Islamic 
legitimacy and power for a significant percentage of Muslims within the international 
community. Because of these realities, the authority and the legitimacy of the nation¬ 
state is being challenged by political transnational actors such as al Qaeda. Hoffman 
notes that, “the legitimacy of the nation-state does not by itself guarantee the nation¬ 
state's . .. [authority] in the international state of nature, and the appeal of nationalism as 
an emancipating passion does not assure that the nation-state must everywhere remain the 
basic form of social organization in a world". In like manner, al Qaeda does not base 
its structure on national identity but rather uses its particular vein of Pan Islamic religious 
fundamentalism as a unifying mechanism that allows the organization to recruit and 
gamer support from the global Muslim community, regardless of national or even 
regional identity. Within the state-of- nature conditions prevalent in the global political 
arena, these geopolitical realities allow for a transnational actor such as al Qaeda to 
flourish in gamering popular support. 
101 James P. Piscatori and Susann Hoeber Rudolph, Transnational Religion and 
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If al Qaeda continues to garner support from some of the international Muslim 
communities, then one can conceivably expect a continuance of terrorism, played out in 
the international state of nature and directed against the United States-led community of 
interests. Similarly, if the United States continues its attempts at unipolar, hegemonic 
dominance through state-facilitated political violence and the facilitation of financial 
incentives to encourage compliance with American foreign policy, then al Qaeda may 
gamer even more support for and recruitment of Muslims who are fearful, diffident, and 
resentful of American global dominance. 
Summarizing Thoughts 
This chapter has sought to clarify the contention that it is the Hobbesian natural 
egoistic tendencies (pursuit of self-interests, pursuit of glory, and pursuit of self- 
preservation) of human political actors, expressed through the political apparatuses of 
their respective states, institutions, organizations, or groups acting out in the international 
state of nature that leads to political violence (inclusive of the September 11 attacks) in 
global affairs. Secondly, this chapter has shown that these natural egoistic tendencies 
lead to diffidence and equality of desire among human political actors, which further 
exacerbate the state-of-nature conditions in global affairs. Furthermore, the historical 
realities of group conflict between warring, primitive groups, have evolved into the 
complexities of contemporary international relations, of which transnational terrorism is 
one phenomenon. It was these egoistic state-of-nature conditions, both historical and 
hypothetical, that led a subordinate transnational actor (al Qaeda) to facilitate terrorist 
attacks against a dominant actor (the United States.) on September 11, 2001. 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The September 11 terrorist attacks are an example of acts of political violence 
that, unfortunately, killed thousands of American noncombatant civilians. Political 
violence across the globe represents phenomena that kill thousands of noncombatant 
civilians, annually. However, the September 11 attack brought political violence to the 
American homeland. These attacks occurred on American soil and not in some distant 
place seemingly light years from the realities of everyday American life. This was the 
first major foreign attack on U.S. soil since the Pearl Harbor attacks1 and the War of 
1812. These attacks left a legacy of fear, diffidence, and vengefulness in the psyche of 
Americans that will be historically relevant for generations to come. Anytime a loss of 
life occurs in the pursuit of political goals, whether these goals are considered legitimate 
or not, it reflects the inability of human political actors to put into place the institutional 
structures and restraints necessary to limit the expression of the Hobbesian natural 
egoistic tendencies outlined in this study. 
1 Scribe Multipublishing Services, Essential Pearl Harbor [on-line resource] 
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Other Perspectives of September 11 
Various simplistic perspectives have emerged to explain the causes of the 
September 11 attacks. For example, Lee Harris points out that the roots of Arab 
terrorism lie in the historical realities of the economic and political subjugation of poor 
Muslim societies by Western societies.3 While this explanation does provide a 
somewhat realistic historical analysis, it fails to provide a complete conceptual model that 
takes into account relevant political realities. Conversely, G. W. Bush provided a 
similarly simplistic but different analysis, when he told American citizens, the media, and 
the world that the reasons for the attacks lie in the fact that the terrorists are “evil” and 
represent “dark forces” that hate America because it is a prosperous, democratic society.4 
Based on this logic, President Bush has reasoned, the most rational approach to counter 
these “dark forces” is to engage in a type of modem-day military “crusade” against Arab 
Muslim society until we root out anti-American sentiment.5 Reasoning 
3 Lee Harris, “A1 Qaeda's Fantasy Ideology: War Without Clausewitz,” Policy 
Review 114 (2002): 20-21. 
4 Tisdall, Simon. “Resist the Official Pol-Speak [sicjof Bush's 'War on Terror': 
From Civilization' to 'WMD' - Words are Weapons in the Global Crusade,” [newspaper 
on-line] (London: Guardian Newspapers Limited, 4 November 2003, accessed 13 




such as this reflects a Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations” that further exacerbates the 
state-of-war conditions in the international state of nature.6 However, while such narrow 
explanations may have served the Bush Administration's need for a straightforward 
rhetorical answer to this question, any truly scholarly, theoretical approach that takes into 
account the existence of the Hobbesian egoistic tendencies and the realities of the 
conditions prevalent in the international state of nature would largely reject this analysis. 
Amongst propagandized rhetoric, over-emotive responses, unfounded claims of weapons 
of mass destruction, nationalistic fervor, and narrow horticultural metaphors, there is a 
need for an objective analysis that attempts to rationalize the causes and manifestations of 
the September 11 attacks within a theoretical framework that ultimately can yield a 
practical and realistic explanatory model. 
A Brief Review of Research Structure and Objectives 
Toward that end, this study hypothesized that one such theoretical framework that 
can be employed to answer the perplexing questions concerning the causes of the attacks 
lie in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, his concept of egoist human nature, and 
his view of the state of nature extrapolated to the state-of-war conditions that exist in 
international relations. The main objective of this study has been to draw a conceptual 
connection between the expression of these egoistic tendencies by human political actors, 
certain historical realities concerning the evolution of competing/warring groups, and the 
dynamic occurrences prevalent in the international state of nature to the following 
question: What caused the September 11 terrorist attacks? 
6 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order, first trade paperback edition (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 183-185. 
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In further support of the hypothesis adopted in this analysis, Seumas Milne posits 
that America’s “record of unabashed national egotism and arrogance . .. drives anti- 
Americanism among swaths of the world's population, for whom there is little democracy 
in the current distribution of global wealth and power.”7 Individuals of Islamic faith 
represent a huge global demographic, one comprised largely of non-democratic nation¬ 
states. To a significant degree, they also represent one variable in the unequal balance of 
global wealth and power. At the top end of this unequal distribution of wealth and power 
o 
is the U.S., characterized by its continued egoistic pursuit of more wealth and power. As 
outlined in this study, the egoistic pursuit of power and glorification also seems to 
underlay the objectives of al Qaeda.9 Consequently, the September 11 attacks tactically 
represent one political act in the strategic plan of the al Qaeda organization in the 
accomplishment of these objectives.10 One example of the connection between Islamic 
terrorism and glorification is the fact that, syntactically speaking, the notion of “jihad 
7 Seumas Milne, They Can't See Why They Are Hated: Americans Cannot Ignore 
What Their Government Does Abroad,” [on-line magazine] (London: Guardian 
Newspapers, Guardian Unlimited, 13 September 2001, accessed 29 September 2001); 
available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,551036,00.html; 
Internet 
Ibid. 




[means] .. . supreme personal sacrifice in order to raise the word of Allah.”11 In other 
words, a jihad is carried out to glorify Islam through personal sacrifice. 
This study has further shown that egoistic tendencies, such as the desire for 
glorification, pursuit of conservation, pursuit of self-interest, and competition for power 
among political actors acting out in the global arena, lead to the international state of 
nature in which political actors, as opposed to lone individuals in the Hobbesian 
hypothetical state of nature, carry out egoist-based hostilities against each other. This 
study clearly delineated that these acts of hostility or violence are synonymous with acts 
in the historical state of nature, represented by conflicts among warring groups. These 
warring groups evolved into villages, cities, city-states, and eventually nation-states. As 
the nation-state became the most dominant actor in international relations, powerful 
nation-state actors began repressing weak nation-state actors as well as groups with no 
national affiliations or bonds whose lack of national sovereignty and insufficient 
capabilities forced them into subordinate positions of power. 
A Brief Summation of How the Historical State of Nature Motivates al Qaeda to 
Engage in Political Violence 
One of the emerging non-state groups, the Mujahadin, evolved to challenge, and 
with U.S. military support, eventually defeat a powerful nation-state - the Soviet Union. 
After the defeat of the Soviet Union, al Qaeda evolved out of a faction of the Mujahadin 
into a fully developed transnational network and turned its resources of power toward the 
remaining superpower (i.e., the U.S.) in an attempt to achieve the political goals outlined 
11 Rohan Gunaranta, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: 
Berkley Publishing Group, a division of penguin group - USA, 2002), 112. 
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in this study. A1 Qaeda, acting out within its dimensions of power, appears to believe 
that terrorist acts, such as the September 11 attacks, provide the only available 
mechanism for it to challenge the dominate power of the United States, its allies, and 
client states (the U.S.-led community of interests). Contained in these assumptions are 
the apparent causes of the September 11 attacks. 
Within the state-of-war conditions that exist in the international state of nature, 
actors view violence as a means to political ends. Specifically, al Qaeda views American 
citizens, interests, allies, and client states as prime targets for acts of political violence. 
This transnational political organization takes the radical view of Islamic theology to its 
militant conclusions, viewing certain elements of the U.S.-led community of interests as 
the “Great Satan,” that seeks to destroy (and at a minimum corrupt) the Islamic world.13 
These realities represent Hobbesian state-of-nature antagonisms and feelings of 
diffidence placed within the realities of a radical Islamic perspective. By successfully 
attacking a major political actor, al Qaeda thrust itself onto the international stage as a 
major player in global affairs and is now perceived by many as the largest threat to 
American interests since the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is apparent that al 
Qaeda perceives terrorist acts as an opportunity to challenge a dominant global 
19» • • • 
"Osama bin Laden’s Two Minute Audio Tape Broadcast to Mark the First 
Anniversary of the U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan,"broadcasted on Al Jazeera, Arab 
satellite television station, Qatar, 6 October 2002, quoted in Inside Al Qaeda: Global 
Network of Terror, by Rohan Gunaranta (New York: Berkley Publishing Group/a 
Division of Penguin Group - USA), 2002. 
13 Ibid.,119. 
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competitor that it deems a threat to the interests of the majority of Muslims in the 
world.14 
Because America has overwhelming military power and the financial resources to 
buy allies and supporters, al Qaeda uses terrorist acts to decrease the relative power of the 
U.S. This strategy leads to more political violence in the global arena and a scenario of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism. The actions on the part of both political actors facilitate 
political violence, and these actions result in an increase in hostilities in the global 
political arena. As a reflection of this, the September 11 attacks by al Qaeda exacerbated 
the state-of-nature circumstances that already existed in the international political arena. 
Correspondingly, the Bush Administration's counter-terrorism measure, or so-called 
“War on Terror,” has also exacerbated the state-of-nature circumstances in international 
relations. As noted in this study, the diffidence created by the September 11 attacks were 
used by the Bush Administration as a mechanism to initiate a foreign policy agenda that 
called for preemptive military strikes and occupations in the oil-rich, Central Asian 
region of the world. 
The U.S. has the most powerful and destructive military force in the history of the 
world. Moreover, the U.S. has the most weapons of mass destruction of any nation-state 
in the world, and the historical record illustrates that it has readily shown a propensity to 
unleash violence on other political actors. Conceivably, the G. W. Bush Administration 
has intensified this legacy after September 11 in what appears to be the beginning of a 
strategy to amplify an American-led global community of interests, consisting of 
American allies, a set of client states, a global political and economic elite and their 
14Gunaratna, 122. 
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managers, and a class/partisan hegemony ruled by conservative Republicans and some 
moderate Democrats (the “Demo-Rebulicrats”) [sic] and spearheaded and maintained by 
American military might.15 As pointed out in this study, many of the policy changes 
initiated after September 11 are part of a larger political agenda that has been pushed for 
years by high-ranking members of the G. W. Bush Administration. However, until the 
terrorist attacks occurred on U.S. soil, these initiatives could not be legitimized in 
Congress or to the American public in the post-Cold War environment of military 
cutbacks.16 Acting in a perfect Hobbesian manner, these actors seized upon the 
September 11 tragedy and began to implement their agendas. 
AI Qaeda and the G. W. Bush Administration as Egoistic Political Actors 
Both al Qaeda and the Bush Administration represent political actors who have 
specific political goals and objectives and who are responding to these goals and 
objectives based on the following: 
1. The political leadership of both regimes is playing out a Hobbesian game of the 
expression of the stated egoistic tendencies of equality, diffidence, and pursuit of self- 
interest; 
2. The political leadership of both regimes is playing out a Hobbesian game 
consisting of the competition for political power; and 
15 Ali Moossavi, “9/1 l's Significance,” [on-line newspaper] (Detroit: The South 
End Newspaper, 10 September 2002, accessed 18 November 2003); available from 
http://www.southend.wayne.edu/days/2002/sept/9102002/oped/911/91 l.html; Internet. 
16 William C. Banks and Jeffrey D. Straussman, “Defense Contingency Budgeting 
in the Post-Cold-War World,” Public Administration Review 59, no. 2 (1999): 135-136. 
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3. In the absence of an international sovereign with sufficient political authority, 
the state-of-war conditions prevalent in the international political arena are exacerbated 
by both al Qaeda and the G. W. Bush administration. 
Both political actors—al Qaeda and the G. W. Bush Administration-may view 
their relevant power positions as being enhanced by this international state of nature. The 
U.S., as the most powerful military force in the world, benefits from the international 
state of nature because it has the ability to dominate militarily and these conditions allow 
the governing leadership to do whatever it deems necessary. Furthermore, because there 
is a state of nature, American political authority in the U.S. is justified in doing whatever 
it desires, based on the right or reason of state identified in this study. Similarly, al 
Qaeda sees the state of nature as a justification to carry out terrorist attacks, since, in a 
state of nature, actors can do whatever they deem necessary. Additionally, al Qaeda 
views terrorism as a mechanism to enhance their relative dimensions of power and 
simultaneously decrease the relative power of the U.S. Furthermore, the noted Hobbesian 
concept of the equality of desire in the state of nature is congruent with the terrorist 
strategy of attacking the noncombatant civilian targets of a more dominant actor as a 
means of somewhat leveling the playing field in global affairs. 
Caught in the middle of this Hobbesian state of war are noncombatant civilians on 
both sides who are trying daily to survive and could generally care less about the power 
struggles of these actors. These civilian noncombatants are the real victims of this state 
of war. Both al Qaeda and the Bush Administration engage in the rhetorical use of 
symbolic language to influence and manipulate these noncombatants into believing that it 
is the other sided that is responsible for the violence and hostilities. The manipulation of 
150 
rhetoric is used by the Bush Administration and al Qaeda as a means to sway public and 
media opinion so that they can achieve their respective political agendas, which, in both 
instances, may be detrimental to civilians on either side. In some instances, the behavior 
of the United States-led community of interests has given credence to the rhetoric of al 
Qaeda. Conversely, the continued violent actions and rhetoric of al Qaeda has given 
credence to the propagandized language of the American-led community of interests. 
Violent Conflict Resolution in the International State of Nature: Global Social 
Contract and Shifting American Foreign Policy 
If Hobbes's egoistic conceptions of self-interested, survival-oriented behavior 
carried out in the state-of-war conditions of the international state of nature are correct, 
then we should expect a continuance of hostilities in the form of war and terrorism. 
Based on these realities, what are the possibilities for limiting both U.S.-sponsored 
political violence and Islamic-based terrorism in the future? 
One conceptual possibility is the initiation of a type of global social contract 
similar in structure to the Hobbesian social contract. This contract would conceivably 
consist of a covenant between a significant number of political actors acting out in 
international affairs who agree to surrender certain rights to a global political sovereign 
that is empowered with enough political and military authority to limit the tendency 
toward violent conflict. In order for an international sovereign to be effective it would 
have to be relatively objective and be willing to consider the interests of both dominant 
and subordinate actors, as well as state and non-state actors. Applying the conceptual 
proposition of an international sovereign to the concerns of this study yields the 
following possibilities: 
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1. An objective global sovereign would potentially consider the interests of 
subordinate actors such as those that represent the varying interests of the international 
Arab and Islamic community; 
2. An objective global sovereign would potentially help facilitate free democratic 
elections in Arab Muslim nation-states that currently do not have a democratically-based 
political authority; 
3. An objective global sovereign would potentially help provide the mechanisms 
to create a Palestinian state and limit violent conflict between Israel and Arab Muslims; 
4. An objective global sovereign would potentially help provide for a 
redistribution of wealth in Arab Muslim societies that would limit the recruitment of 
potential terrorists by radical Islamic elements; and 
5. An objective global sovereign would potentially limit the political violence and 
exploitation carried out by the United States-led community of interests against Muslims. 
The accomplishment of these goals could conceivably result in a limitation of 
political violence such as the September 11 attacks. However, it is inconceivable that an 
international sovereign with sufficient political and military authority to accomplish the 
above-stated goals could be established in the foreseeable future. A more realistic 
approach for limiting political violence such as the September 11 attacks lies with a 
potential foreign policy shift by the United States government. 
Shifting American Foreign Policy: Theory or Possibility? 
As outlined in this study, the most dominant power in a global, hierarchical 
community of interests has the ability to bring divergent interests under its control and to 
mediate those same interests. The problem is that the dominant actor tends to allow only 
152 
those actors which serve its interests into its hierarchical community of interests. 
Secondly, actors that are left out of the dominant actor's community of interests may be 
inclined to challenge the authority of the dominant actor in a competitive game of interest 
articulation. By placing these conceptions into a Hobbesian framework, it can be shown 
that control by the dominant actor may be perceived by subordinate actors as being worse 
than the complete state of nature, absent of any sufficient sovereign authority. 
Consequently, some subordinate actors may take actions to bring about, or at a minimum, 
exacerbate the state of nature in hopes of causing a redistribution of power that benefits 
them more than the set of circumstances that are dictated by the dominant actor. The 
extension of these ideas to the realistic conditions of the United States as the dominant 
actor in the hierarchical community of interests and al Qaeda as a subordinate actor left 
out of this community of interests, provide a casual explanation for the acts of political 
violence carried out by al Qaeda. 
However, the question is: How can the United States (as the dominant actor in 
the unipolar community of interests) limit the levels of political violence, including 
terrorism, in the global political arena? At its foundation, the key to answering this 
question lies in the fact that the United States is the dominant actor. Within the 
American-led hierarchy of interests, the United States has some power to require 
members of its community of interests to take actions that will lend itself to a limiting of 
the causes of violent conflict. Not surprisingly, some of these potential actions mirror the 
potential actions noted regarding a conceptual global sovereign. Toward that end, the 
United States could pressure Israel to allow for the creation of a sovereign Palestinian 
state and the entry of United Nations troops to ensure the security of this new state. 
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Secondly, the United States could provide financial assistance to the new Palestinian state 
that is more in line with the levels of aid given to Israel. Thirdly, the United States could 
also pressure the sovereign powers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt to initiate more 
egalitarian political systems. Fourthly, the U.S. could completely withdraw its military 
personnel from Iraq in favor of a U.N. military contingency that would help ensure 
impartial democratic elections. Potentially, these actions taken collectively would 
potentially send a message to the Arab Muslim world that the United States will not 
support the repression of Arab Muslims by Israel or its Arab allies and client states. 
In addition, the United States must tone down its hegemonic empire building and 
military initiatives throughout the world and lessen its desire to always blatantly take 
actions that are in its own best interests but in direct opposition to the interests of 
subordinate nation-states, ethnic and religious groups, and groups with transnational 
affiliations. By doing this, the United States government sends the message that 
America, as the world’s most powerful political actor, is not to be feared but relied upon 
to act in a responsible manner. These actions would limit the feelings of diffidence 
regarding the United States and would limit the mass popular appeal of violent, extremist 
groups such as al Qaeda, as the extremist rhetoric of these groups will not reflect the true 
actions of the United States. As long as the United States continues to carryout military 
attacks and occupations against Muslim societies, these actions will destroy any positive 
“image of America in the minds of ordinary Muslims.”17 As Professor Bernard Haykel 
17 Bernard Haykel, “Avoiding Bin Laden's Trap,” [newspaper on-line] (DAWN, 
The Internet Edition, The DAWN Group of Newspapers, 8 October 2001 accessed 18 
December 2001); available from http://www.dawn.eom/2001/10/08/op.htm#2; Internet. 
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writes, “the war America is engaged in after the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) 
and the Pentagon is a war for the hearts and minds of average Muslims around the 
world.”18 
The Applicability of Hobbes’s Theory to a Shift in U. S. Foreign Policy 
On the face of it, it appears that such policy changes on the part of the United 
States as discussed above would be in opposition to the basic arguments of Hobbes that 
have been outline in this study. However, initiating the above-stated policy shifts reflects 
an Hobbesian frame of reference for the following reasons: 
1. One of the main Hobbesian egoistic tendencies is the pursuit of self-interest, 
and it is conceivable that, by initiating these policy shifts, the United States government 
could limit violence in the international political arena, which in turn could limit the 
threat of terrorist acts being carried out against American civilians and ultimately 
increase the national security of the United States (which, according to Hobbes is the 
obligation of the domestic sovereign power); 
2. Hobbes posits that, based on the first, Fundamental Law of Nature, every 
individual should seek peace as far as he or she expects to have peace; 
3. Extending this concept to international relations, it can be shown that, like 
individuals in the individual state of nature, human political actors in the international 
state of nature should seek peace as far as they expect their nation-state, transnational 
organization, or political group to have peace; and 
4. A further extension of Hobbes’s theory to international affairs yields the 
conceptualization that it is the first, Fundamental Law of Nature that balances the stated 
18 Ibid. 
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natural egoist tendencies and provides the basis for limiting hostilities in international 
relations. 
One argument against the United States initiating these policy shifts could be that, 
even if they were undertaken, the al Qaeda leadership and other radical Islamic actors 
would still carry out terrorist acts against American interests and citizens. Indeed, this 
could conceivably be the case. However, a facilitation of the above-stated policy shifts 
could lead to the following: 
1. A decrease in the ability of radical Islamic actors to gamer financial support; 
2. A decrease in their mass appeal among the international Muslim community; 
and 
3. A decrease in their ability to recruit Muslims into their organizations. 
If in fact these proposed policy shifts were effective toward these ends, then this could 
potentially lead to an erosion of these militant organizations and consequently limit 
political violence such as the September 11 attacks. If this were the case, then these 
policy shifts would represent effective counter-terrorism measures. 
Summarizing Statements 
In conclusion, this study has outlined and illustrated through a logical progression 
of ideas and deductive reasoning that the applicability of Hobbes’s egoistic state of nature 
extended to global affairs provides an explanatory framework for analyzing the causes of 
the September 11 attacks. Subsequently, if the egoistic-based state-of-war conditions 
prevalent in the international state of nature are not reversed, and the current United 
States-led community of interests continues its hegemonic dominance, and al Qaeda 
continues to pursue the egoistic glorification of radical Islamic ideology through political 
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violence, then it is unfortunately likely that terrorist acts such as the September 11 attacks 
will continue against American citizens, American interests, United States allies, and 
United States client states. 
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